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INTRODUCTION
This article explores the constitutional constraints on the ability of local
governments to attach conditions, or "exactions," to discretionary land use
permits in an effort to address future cumulative impacts to which proposed
development is anticipated to contribute.' Unlike traditional exactions that
respond to immediate development harms, these "exactions for the future"
can present land assembly concerns and involve inherently uncertain long-
range forecasting. However, it is not clear that these practical impediments
are sufficient to warrant the current near-categorical prohibition on such
exactions that is imposed by Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
jurisprudence.2 Indeed, reasonable implementation of exactions for the
future could serve as a sensible approach to counter modern development
challenges presented by population rise and climate change, which threaten
to place new stresses on public infrastructure and the environment.3 After
'A "discretionary" permit is one the government is not legally obligated to provide.
2In a prior article, I analyzed the contours of property's multiple dimensions-theory, space,
stringency, and time-as they arise in exaction takings contests. See Timothy M. Mulvaney,
Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE & ENV'T L. 277 (2011). That piece suggested that issues of
temporality stand as the most perplexing, unsettled, and multi-faceted of these dimensions. I
asserted that deducing property's temporal characteristics plays an important role in two contexts
that are particularly relevant to the realm of exaction takings. That article assessed the first:
defining the point in time-be it upon the proposition or imposition of regulatory action-when
property's other dimensions attach as to any particular takings claimant. This article assesses the
second: accounting for the delay between a regulatory action and the external impact that
regulation is intended to cure.
Of course, conditioning land use permits is not the only, or even the primary, tool for
dealing with future environmental or infrastructural impacts of new development. However, it is a
tool, and an important one at that, to respond to unique circumstances posed by development
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analyzing the features of takings law that constrict the use of such an
exactions scheme, this article offers an alternative approach to exaction
imposition involving temporal segmentation of the government's sought-
after interest, which could provide a public tool to address anticipated future
harms while offering at least some protection against takings claims.
Part I of the article surveys the historical rise of exactions to situate their
role in the context of modern land use planning and takings law. As
explained in more detail below, the regular practice of imposing exactions
took hold amidst the suburbanization that followed World War II. 4 Fiscally
constrained state and local governments sought to counter the
infrastructural and environmental impacts resulting from this new
development at a time when public revenues from conventional sources
were insufficient to keep pace.5  Traditionally, state courts exclusively
policed exactions in a manner quite deferential to public authorities,
warding off only those egregious, indefensible abuses of this land use tool.6
That model subsisted with few complaints for several decades, as
governments commonly employed exactions quite reasonably.' However,
beginning in 1987 amidst certain Justices' suspicions that such a
discretionary power regularly could be used in an exploitative fashion, a
divided U.S. Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission8
and Dolan v. City of Tigarc9 identified more stringent criteria for reviewing
applications. See, e.g., Jessica Grannis, Adaptation Tool Kit: Sea-Level Rise and Coastal Land
Use, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER, 29-30 (October 2011) http://www.georgetownclimate.org/
sites/default/files/AdaptationTool KitSLR.pdf (identifying exactions as one of eighteen land
use tools that can be used to preemptively respond to the threats posed by sea-level rise); J. PETER
BYRNE & JESSICA GRANNIS, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO
CLIMATE CHANGE (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina F. Kuh eds., forthcoming 2012), available at
http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/2011 TakingsConference/14%2OByrne-%20Coastal%
20Retreat%20Measures.pdf (suggesting that exactions "could allow for continued development
while preserving the right to require future retreat [from the coast]").
4 See Carlos A. Ball & Laurie Reynolds, Exactions and Burden Distribution in Takings Law,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1523 (2006).
5 See STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW SECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT AND
FuNDING INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE DOLAN ERA xxxiii (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek
eds., 1995) [hereinafter EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND DEDICATIONS].
6See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture ofAmerican Land Use Regulation: Paying
for Growth With Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 199-201 (2006).
8Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
9 Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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exactions.10 In accord with these cases, the permitting entity must prove
that exactions eliminating a landowner's right to exclude-and possibly
other types of exactions, as well"-bear an "essential nexus" to and are in
"rough proportionality" with the development's impacts to avoid takings
liability.12
With this historical and jurisprudential backdrop in place, Part II
introduces "exactions for the future." The Part begins by differentiating
exactions for the future from traditional exactions of the kind to which the
formalism of Nollan and Dolan are more easily applied. It then presents a
hypothetical coastal permitting scenario that involves two contexts in which
exactions for the future conceivably could be levied: (1) the proposed
development is unlikely to create traffic problems immediately, yet it is
forecasted to contribute to significant traffic congestion when coupled with
other projected development on neighboring lots; and (2) several reputable
scientific sources predict that the development could accelerate or amplify
the impacts of sea-level rise. With the aid of this hypothetical, Part 1I
characterizes exactions for the future as permit conditions that impose an
immediate burden on the applicant developer but are designed to mitigate
harm from development that will only be felt in the future.13 Part 11 closes
with a discussion of several practical hurdles related to land assembly and
forecasting uncertainty that can pose difficulties for local governments
considering the implementation of this type of exaction.
Part III explores two unique features of the U.S. Supreme Court's
exaction takings jurisprudence that presumably flow from the land
assembly and forecasting uncertainties identified in Part II. First, the Court
has demonstrated a peculiar disfavor toward exactions that are part of larger
or long-term community plans, marking a significant break from planning's
place in two other major areas of takings law: regulatory takings and
"public use" jurisprudence.14 Second, the Court's exaction takings tests
to While the Supreme Court contended in Dolan that the standard it was imposing under the
federal constitution was consonant with the existing standard then in effect in the majority of
states, this article contests that contention. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
1 See Mulvaney, supra note 2, at 287-88.
12See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (holding that "the city must make
some sort of individualized determination" regarding the quantitative relationship between the
permit condition and the development's impacts).
13 For purposes of this article, the term "permit" encompasses successful applications for
zoning modifications, subdivision, site plan review, construction permits, variances, and the like.
1
4 See infra Part III.A.
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curiously authorize heightened judicial scrutiny of exactions' rationality-a
traditional due process question, only more probing-and allow for takings
liability findings in instances where the economic impact of the exaction is
quite modest.' 5 Part III concludes, then, that the existing exaction takings
framework reflects an aversion to planning and a reversion to probing
judicial review, which in combination effectively serve to categorically
prohibit exactions for the future.
Assuming these features of exaction takings law will remain in place for
the considerable future, 16 Part IV outlines the contours of an alternative
approach to exaction imposition that could open the door for reasonable
implementation of exactions aimed at anticipated harms. This approach
involves the conceptual idea of incorporating temporally severed property
interests into the realm of land use exactions, such that the government
might condition approvals not on a present dedication or easement, but
rather on a future interest that is triggered upon the happening of a stated
event. Such an approach could at least partially mollify landowners'
practical assembly and forecasting concerns that exactions for the future
initially spark. Moreover, in light of the fact that the present value of the
exacted future interest would be discounted by the rate of return the
landowner could reap for the relevant piece of land, compounded over the
number of years likely to pass before the triggering event is anticipated to
occur, this approach also could soften any economic injury. The Part also,
however, identifies several disadvantages of this approach to exaction
imposition, particularly with respect to potential spoliation of the relevant
property and insufficient governmental enforcement.
Part V concludes that property owners' concerns regarding land
assembly and forecasting uncertainty have bred an exaction takings model
that creates a significant impediment to imposing exactions responsive to
those development harms that will manifest only in the future. It suggests
that acknowledging the unique features of this area of law that are
constraining the implementation of exactions for the future could prompt a
broader debate about the nature of property and the constitutional barriers to
land use regulation in an era of considerable population and environmental
change. However, so long as the current stringent takings review of
exactions remains intact, Part V suggests that, to temper landowners'
15 See infra Part Ill.B.
16See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (unanimously reaffirming that
Nollan and Dolan are applicable when claimants challenge exactions as unconstitutional takings).
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apprehensions surrounding assembly and forecasting accuracy, local
governments might consider the alternative approach to conditioning
development permits that is outlined herein.
I. EXACTIONS' PLACE
In theory, land use exactions oblige property owners to internalize the
expected external burdens from proposed intensified use of their land in
accord with a discretionarily issued government permit.17  This Part first
reviews the rise of exactions as an important land use tool for fiscally-
constrained state and local governments, particularly in the face of fervent
voter opposition to new and increased taxation. Then, to set the stage for
the lengthy discussion of exactions for the future in the Parts that follow,
this Part explains the marked shift from generally deferential state judicial
scrutiny of land use exactions towards the stringent judicial scrutiny
reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court's exaction takings jurisprudence.
A. The Prelude to Exaction Takings
Throughout the nineteenth century and leading up to the Great
Depression, subdividing land required only a whim, a pen, and a map.18
The fact that large landholders bore no responsibility for constructing
public improvements needed to serve these subdivided lands led to a rash of
what has been characterized as "premature" subdivision. 9  This
overabundance of subdivided lots led to vacancy and tax delinquency,
" See generally Vicki Been, "Exit" As a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 479 (1991); Daniel A. Crane,
Comment, A Poor Relation? Regulatory Takings after Dolan v. City of Tigard, 63 U. CHI. L. REv.
199, 199 (1996); Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The
Institutional Contexts ofExactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 733-34 (2007) [hereinafter Fenster,
Constitutional Shadow]; Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions
and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 609, 623-24 (2004) [hereinafter Fenster,
Takings Formalism]; Eduardo Mois6s Pelalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182,
2196-97 (2004); Deborah Rhoads, Developer Exactions and Public Decision Making in the
United States and England, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 469, 469, 474 (1994); Nick Rosenberg,
Comment, Development Impact Fees: Is Limited Cost Internalization Actually Smart Growth?, 30
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 641, 641-42 (2003).
See R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community Benefit
Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 5, 5 (1987).
"See id.
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depriving municipalities of the ability to incentivize commercial
development with public infrastructural support.20  This phenomenon, in
turn, impeded orderly growth, for it induced potential developers to skip
over these blighted "dead lands" and carve out new subdivisions on the still
farther outskirts of town. 1
The Standard City Planning Enabling Act of 1928 sought to respond to
this problem.22 The Act counseled municipalities to condition land use
approval on the developer providing necessities such as "streets, water
mains, sewer lines, and other utility structures" to cope with the increased
infrastructural impact in the immediate area. These permit conditions
were the first routinely institutionalized exactions, and they typically only
took the form of direct infrastructural enhancement; in other words, the first
exactions focused on impacts that the applicant would be able to remedy
internally (i.e., on-site) and in the near term. 24  The Great Depression
spurred this early practice of internal exactions, as other sources of
infrastructure funding-ad valorem taxes and special assessments-went
unpaid under the weight of the economic decline.25 The real estate
community challenged these conditional requirements, but it almost
universally failed to sway the courts in its favor.26 By the middle of the
twentieth century, imposing internal exactions on subdividers and
developers had become common practice.
20 
See id.
21Id ("[New] residential developments leapfrogged over... areas of dead land into
unsubdivided lands lying beyond the old, moribund subdivisions.").
22 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT III
(1928).
23 Jennifer Evans-Cowley, Development Exactions: Process and Planning Issues 3 (Lincoln
Inst. of Land Policy, Working Paper WP06JEC1, 2006).
24 See id.
25 See Smith, supra note 18, at 6 (explaining a cycle whereby incentives to pay special
assessments-levied to construct physical improvements on subdivided parcels-arose only when
the assessed lot had been improved and foreclosure proceedings to reap these payments largely
proved worthless because of the depreciation in land values). See also Been, supra note 17, at 479
(suggesting that "[e]xactions are an outgrowth of the centuries-old practice of levying 'special
assessments' . . . [because in] the 1920s and 1930s, widespread bankruptcies and delinquencies on
special assessments . .. left many local governments unable to recoup the costs of public
improvements.").
26 See, e.g., Ridgefield Land Co. v. Detroit, 217 N.W. 58 (Mich. 1928) (subdivision street
dedications); Mefford v. City of Tulare, 228 P.2d 847 (Cal. Dist. Crt. App. 1951) (sewers); Brous
v. Smith, 106 N.E.2d 503 (N.Y. 1952) (roadway improvements); Petterson v. City of Naperville,
137 N.E.2d 371 (Ill. 1956) (gutters and curbs).
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In conjunction with the mass suburbanization and associated social ills
that followed World War II, select local governments began to take
regulatory actions that imposed external (i.e., off-site) requirements, as
well.27 In the face of federal and state funding cuts to local governments in
the 1970s and 1980s, developer-borne exactions looked more and more like
an attractive option to the public and its elected representatives when
compared with the otherwise increased local property taxes that residents
would shoulder.2 8 Over the course of time, wastewater facilities, schools,
public parks, precinct houses, fire stations, and even day care services
became public welfare projects that developers might be expected to help
provide in conjunction with the government's approval of their proposed
land use intensification. 29
B. Exaction Takings
As might be expected, developers fought vehemently against the
expansion of exactions to include these types of off-site improvements,
alleging inequities, inefficiencies, and general ineffectiveness in what they
saw as a piecemeal, ad hoc land use permitting process. 30 This time, the
landowners had some-albeit very limited-success.3 This success
generally came in the form of state laws and state supreme court decisions
imposing varying-though rarely stringent-constraints on local
27See Evans-Cowley, supra note 23, at 3. Discussing these emerging requirements in a
general sense, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in the 1950s that the police power
encompassed more than "public health, public safety, [and] morality," but could also be used to
make the surrounding "community ... beautiful as well as healthy." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26, 32-33 (1954).
28See Evans-Cowley, supra note 23, at 3.
29 See id. at 3-4; Been, supra note 17, at 479; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 5,
at xxxiii-xxxiv.
30See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 1042 (6th ed. 2006) ("[Flor local
communities, enacting regulations is like printing money, because the legal restrictions can be
relaxed in exchange for goods and services."); Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal
Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 841-46 (1983)
("[C]ritics object most to the piecemeal changes in local land regulations [including]... the
'conditional use permit . . ..').
"1Compare, e.g., Arrowhead Dev. Co. v. Livingston Cnty. Rd. Comm'n, 322 N.W.2d 702
(Mich. 1982) (concluding that a county did not have authority to require a developer to improve
an off-site road), with, e.g., Hudson Oil Co. of Mo., Inc. v. City of Wichita, 396 P.2d 271 (Kan.
1964) (upholding a requirement that a developer dedicate an off-site right of way for a service
road to prevent private driveway access to an arterial street).
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government use of exactions.3 2 Many states employed a "reasonable
relationship" test that accounted for both the burdens and benefits to the
property owner from the imposed exaction; even those states employing an
arguably more stringent "specifically and uniquely attributable" test
regularly placed the burden of proof on the challenging landowner.3 3 Yet
beginning with Nollan in 1987 and continuing with Dolan seven years later,
the U.S. Supreme Court pronounced a marked shift away from judicial
deference toward municipal use of exactions in the face of landowner
claims that such exactions violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on
taking private property for public use without just compensation.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Court declared that, in
order to avoid takings liability, the state-as the defendant-must prove
that exactions bear an "essential nexus" to the impacts caused by the
permitted development.3 4 Seven years later, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the
Court added an additional requirement to the nexus test of Nollan.3 5 Dolan
compels the state to make an "individualized determination" proving that
the public cost of those harms attributable to the proposed development is
"rough[ly] proportion[ate]" to the cost of the burden borne by the applicant
in reducing those public costs.36
32 For a standard particularly deferential to the government, see Grupe v. California Coastal
Commission, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985) (requiring only an "indirect relationship" between the
exaction and a need attributable to the proposed development).
33 See infra notes 38, t4-l1l9 and accompanying text.
34483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
3 6Id. (holding that "the city must make some sort of individualized determination" regarding
the quantitative nature of the condition). In actuality, the variables appropriate for comparison
under Dolan's "rough proportionality" analysis are not settled. See Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of
Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 93, 107 n.55 (2002) (suggesting that
Dolan 's "rough proportionality" test is "hardly [a] beacon[] of clarity"]. There are at least five
values that could be relevant: (1) the public cost of those harms attributable to the proposed
development; (2) the cost of the burden borne by the applicant in reducing those public costs;
(3) the expected reduction in those public costs resulting from the permit conditions; (4) the
market value of the "property" acquired through the permit condition; and (5) the financial
benefits the applicant will realize from the permit. One could make a colorable argument that the
relevant comparison is between (1) and (2), (1) and (3), (1) and (4), or (3) and (4), and quite
possibly even (1) and (5). For a sampling of literature discussing the variables that are potentially
pertinent in a Dolan analysis, see, e.g., JOHN MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS § 2:19 (2006);
Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U.
L. REV. 859, 885 (1995); Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost ofLochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and
Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 631 (1996).
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The majorities in these contentious five-to-four decisions apparently
were concerned that government officials could extort public infrastructure
and amenities through exactions from landowners with little political
influence. 3 7 Together, the commands of Nollan and Dolan represent a more
stringent standard of review than most, if not all, state courts previously
employed in the permit condition context.
3Scholars long have weighed whether this branch of public choice theory justifies takings
doctrine. For a sampling of this literature, see, e.g., Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings
and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1989); Saul
Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285 (1990); Saul Levmore,
Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333 (1991); Daniel A. Farber, Economic
Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 125 (1992); Daniel A. Farber, Public
Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279 (1992). The claim that waterfront
landowners in risky but desirable locales-such as Nollan and, arguably, Dolan-actually lack
political influence is subject to question. See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, Takings and Natural Hazards
Policy: Public Choice on the Beachfront, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1993) (suggesting that
beachfront landowners are unduly powerful, for this minority group can easily organize politically
in light of their geographic and socioeconomic concentration, and therefore no takings
compensation should be due for coastal development prohibitions because those regulations
simply protect against "special interest" subsidies such as flood insurance and disaster relief);
Vicki Been, Lucas v. the Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause to Promote More Efficient
Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES 221, 228-30 (Gerald Komgold & Andrew P. Morriss eds.,
2004) ("The history of both beachfront development and disaster relief policies confirm what
political theory predicts: beachfront owners repeatedly score considerable victories in federal,
state, and local political battles over the regulation and development of the coast.").
38f the five state cases the Dolan court cited as the foundation of its "rough proportionality"
test-Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1976), Simpson v. City of N. Platte,
292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980), City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex.
1984), Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979), and Jordan v. Vill. ofMenomonee
Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965)-all placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove that
the exaction bore no semblance of reason. See, e.g., EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND
DEDICATIONS, supra note 5 (suggesting that none of the five state cases cited by Dolan as support
for the "rough proportionality" test called for an intermediate standard of review, with the possible
exception of Jordan, 137 N.W.2d 442); Julian R. Kossow, Dolan v. City of Tigard, Takings Law,
and the Supreme Court: Throwing the Baby Out with the Floodwater, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215,
228 (1995) (contending that no state case cited in Dolan called for the level of scrutiny that is
required by the "rough proportionality" test). Indeed, even the few states requiring that exactions
must be "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the developer's project-a test that the Chief
Justice explicitly rejected as too demanding, see Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390 ("We do not think the
Federal Constitution requires such exacting scrutiny. . . .")-generally do not impose the rigor of
the "rough proportionality" test. Of the five state cases cited by the majority as employing the
"specifically and uniquely attributable" test, at least four are not analogous in that they placed the
burden of proof on the government. See, e.g., Wald Corp. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 338 So. 2d 863,
866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (suggesting in 1976 that an Illinois case that the Dolan court would
520 [Vol. 64:2
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II. RELYING ON EXACTIONS TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE
CONTINGENCIES
The paradigmatic exaction immediately responds to a public harm. In
such an instance, the Nollan and Dolan tests outlined in the prior Part are a
relatively easy fit: the exaction passes takings muster only if it is both
qualitatively linked and quantitatively proportionate to the public harms
resulting from the approved project.3 9 For instance, where development
blocks a vertical access way to a public beach, an exaction demanding a
similar, alternative right-of-way to the beach likely would serve as an
appropriate offset, while a dedication of land for the construction of a new
post office would not.40 However, implementation of the exactions tool
often poses significantly more complexity than this paradigmatic example
would suggest. Indeed, as the first section below explains, even Nollan and
Dolan themselves involved conditioning development proposals on
exactions that, at least in part, would not benefit the public until some
indeterminate point in the future. The second section of this Part presents a
hypothetical fact pattern that acutely addresses two instances where such
"exactions for the future" conceivably could be imposed. The third section
builds off the prior two to highlight the principal challenges facing those
local governments that seek to incorporate such exactions into their
permitting models.
later cite as too demanding for federal constitutional purposes-Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v.
Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799 (111. 1961)-placed the burden of proof on the state).
The lone possible exception is Frank Asuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264 A.2d 910, 913 (R.I.
1970), which arguably required the city to prove that a developer's "donation" for recreational
purposes of seven percent of the land to be subdivided as a condition of final plat approval "will
result from activities specifically and uniquely attributable to [the developer]."
39 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
40 However, there are some types of immediate burdens that may be difficult or even
impossible to mitigate in light of Nollan's nexus test, such as the sunlight lost by neighbors due to
the construction of a tall building or the alteration of a historic doorway. See, e.g., David A. Dana,
Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243, 1282-86 (1997)
("If sunlight is blocked, it is blocked, period. [Without Nollan,] the locality could allow the
building but place conditions on the development ... that compensate the locality for the social
cost of lost sunlight . ... [With Nollan], however, the locality cannot impose any conditions ...
because there simply are no conditions that mitigate the specific social costs of the project.");
Been, supra note 17, at 544, n.333 ("It is no less rational for a community to decide that it will
accept an unrelated benefit to make up for the harm than it would be for the community to accept
a related benefit; indeed, if the related benefit would be valued less by the public than the
substitute unrelated benefit, it would be irrational for the city to reject the substitute.").
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A. Nollan and Dolan: Exactionsfor the Present and the Future
In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission's approving the
conversion of an oceanfront cottage to a large home would block the
public's view of the ocean.4 1  The Court concluded that the exaction
attached to that approval-a public walking easement along the ocean-did
not, and could never, alleviate that immediate development impact.42 But if
the public-access-way exaction had been implemented (setting aside the
lack of nexus finding for the moment), it would have in one sense provided
an immediate benefit to the public. The public is entitled to traverse the wet
sand area below the mean high water line in California, as it can in most
states.43 Therefore, travelers along the wet sand (or swimmers and other
water users, for that matter) could have rested or recreated on the dry beach
area adjacent to the Nollans' home at the instant the exaction was
implemented.
Yet the exaction imposed on the Nollans also could have provided a
different public benefit in the future.44 If and when the state exacted or
otherwise accumulated similar easements from all other oceanfront
landowners in the region, the easement on the Nollans' property would
contribute to a continuous public walking corridor on the dry sand.45 This
41Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987).
42Once the majority settled on a narrow definition of "public access" that excluded visual
access, it had little difficulty concluding that a public walking easement did not meet the Court's
new "essential nexus" test. See id. at 837-38. But see id at 849-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(suggesting the majority has an "unrealistically limited conception of what measures could
reasonably be chosen to mitigate the burden produced by a diminution of visual access"). The
Court, however, suggested that a condition restricting the height or width of the proposed
structure, prohibiting fences, or requiring the provision of a public "viewing spot" would alleviate
the view loss, and it would do so immediately. Id. at 836. Some scholars have noted that, if
presented a choice between providing a public viewing spot on one's upland property and an
access corridor along the water, many might very well select the access corridor. See, e.g., Jerold
S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on the Municipal Art
Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 47-48.
43However, several states, including Delaware, Maine, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, are "low
water" states, with public ownership of the submerged lands lying seaward of the mean low water
line. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-81 (2008); Delaware ex rel. Buckson v. Pa. R.R. Co., 228
A.2d 587, 597 (Del. 1967) (stating that the riparian proprietor owns to the low water mark); Bell
v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 176 (Me. 1989); Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 21, 30
(1869) (holding that riparian title extends to the low-water mark, though allowing for public
passage during high tides).
"See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827, 829.
45 See id.
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corridor, assembled over time, would have allowed lateral public access
between two nearby public beaches even at the highest of tides.4 6
In Dolan, the public harms emanating from the applied-for development
took two forms.47 First, the landowner's requested expansion of a hardware
store and paving over a gravel parking lot along a creek would increase
impervious cover, thereby preventing the infiltration of water into the
underlying soil and increasing the current risk of flooding.48 Second, the
expansion of the store would bring more customers into the downtown area,
and with more customers come more cars.4 9 As in Nollan, the exaction at
issue in Dolan-the dedication of a strip of the applicant's land for
floodplain management and a bicycle path-would provide both immediate
and projected future benefits to the public to offset these harms.so The
city's maintenance of the creek's floodplain adjacent to the Dolan's
development could provide near-term public flood protection benefits;
however, the continuous public floodplain possible upon a similar
dedication by all other landowners fronting the creek would provide a
significantly more effective public flood control amenity. Similarly,
whether the public bicycle path would have conferred much of an
immediate public benefit is dependent upon how many other portions of the
path had not yet been acquired or paved by the city.51
B. Hypothetical Exactions for the Future
The above analysis of the exactions at issue in Nollan and Dolan
provides a glimpse into the practical and legal impediments to
implementing exactions for the future. To highlight and more fully
understand these impediments, this section poses a hypothetical fact pattern
46See id.
47Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1994).
48Id. at 382.
49Id. at 379, 389.
sold. at 387-89.
51 The City of Tigard continues to expand the bicycle trail along the creek that abuts the Dolan
property. See Will Vanlue, City of Tigard to Close Another Gap in Fanno Creek Trail,
BIKEPORTLAND.ORG (Jan. 20, 2012, 11:23 AM), http://bikeportland.org/2012/01/20/city-of-
tigard-to-close-another-gap-in-fanno-creek-trail-65540?utm source=feedburner&utmmedium
=feed&utm campaign=Feed%3A+BikePortland+%28BikePortland.org%29. The City of Tigard
recently reported that sixty percent of the city's segments of the fifteen-mile trail are complete.
See Trails in Tigard: Fanno Creek Trail Project, CITY OF TIGARD, (http://www.tigard-
or.gov/community/parks/trailsin tigard.asp (last visited May 6, 2012).
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that offers two contexts in which such exactions might be, in the abstract,
not only a productive counter to the requested development's anticipated
impacts but the only counter.
A hypothetical developer, Branch Durant, owns an undeveloped,
twenty-five acre lot in the coastal town of Cape Surf in the fictional fifty-
first state of Old Jersey. The city's primary coastal corridor, Main Street,
lies to the west of the lot, while the Atlantic Ocean lies to the east. While
Old Jersey no longer issues riparian grants for lands that are flowed by the
tide, the state did issue numerous such grants over a century ago, and
Durant happens to be the lone remaining holder of such a grant in Cape
Surf.52 The grant, issued to Durant's predecessors in 1907, runs the width
of Durant's upland lot and extends 200 feet into the ocean.
Durant seeks to intensify the use of the upland lot by constructing a
multi-unit condominium complex. As delegated by Old Jersey's
constitution, a state statute, and its municipal charter, the Cape Surf City
Council enjoys the authority to deny property owners' applications when
the development would impair the public health, safety, and welfare, as well
as to require owners to mitigate the anticipated effects of their development
as a condition of receiving the necessary regulatory approvals.
Durant files the appropriate application with the city, and the city's
planning staff undertakes a detailed review of the development proposal
therein. The planning staff concludes that Durant has taken considerable
account of the many immediate public impacts of his proposed
development, such as the stresses placed on the city's schools, hospitals,
and sewage infrastructure, as well as the effects on wildlife present in the
region. However, the planning staff identifies two potential public impacts
that Durant's proposal does not take into account. First, while Durant's
development is unlikely to create traffic problems immediately, it is
forecasted to contribute to significant traffic congestion along Main Street
when coupled with other projected development along this stretch of coast.
Second, several reputable scientific sources predict that, in this region of
52 The regular alienation of tidally flowed lands was a common practice in New Jersey and
several other states through the early twentieth century. Today, New Jersey generally only issues
grants for lands that already have been filled in and are no longer flowed by the tide. See
Tidelands Program: Basic Questions and Answers, DIVISION OF LAND USE REGULATION, NEW
JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, http://www.nj.gov
/dep/landuse/tideland.html#q4 (last visited on Apr. 14, 2012).
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Old Jersey, development akin to that proposed by Durant could accelerate
or amplify the impacts of sea-level rise attributable to climate change.
In such a situation, it might be advantageous for both Durant and the
planning staff to discuss their individual positions.54 Durant might express
his willingness and ability to pay impact fees, dedicate land, or limit the
size of his development; the planning staff might convey its concerns about
the project and the development options that it would be willing to
recommend to the city council. Such initial discussions may lead to an
agreement that would result in one or more conditions of an acceptable type
and quantity for both parties. In that instance, Durant would agree to
certain mitigation measures in exchange for a required approval, in light of
the potential draconian alternative: an outright denial of his permit
application, which the city council has the regulatory authority (if not
always the political will) to issue. The city council also might prefer this
negotiated agreement, for it furthers the city's regulatory goals while
limiting the risks and costs associated with litigation that might follow
either a permit denial or unilaterally imposed conditions.
However, in this instance, Durant and the planning staff are not able to
reach a mutually beneficial resolution. The planning staff weighs
recommending that the city council either deny the permit or grant it with
certain mitigating conditions to which Durant would not voluntarily agree.
Increasing global temperatures are accompanied by sea-level rise for two basic reasons.
First, the warmer the water, the more the water expands. In a warmer climate, the seas simply will
occupy more cubic space. Second and more significant, global temperatures dictate what
percentage of the water on earth is in the form of ice. Melted ice is released into the oceans,
thereby contributing to sea-level rise. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working
Group II, Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND
VULNERABILITY 12-17 (M.L. Parry et al., eds., 2007) available at http://www.ipcc-
wg2.gov/AR4/website/spm.pdf. The most damaging effects of sea-level rise along a built coastal
environment-magnified erosion of beaches, heightened coastal flooding, increased public health
and safety risks, damaged public infrastructure, etc.-are not always expected to be felt
immediately after development.
54This paragraph draws heavily from the hypothetical fact pattern presented in a forthcoming
article by Mark Fenster. See Mark Fenster, Failed Exactions, 36 Vermont L. Rev. (forthcoming
2012).
ssThis hypothetical assumes the highly likely event that Durant's property would maintain
economic value in the event the city council denied this particular development proposal, whereby
Cape Surf would not be required to provide compensation to Durant for the denial under the
partial takings framework set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438




Ultimately, the city council accepts a planning staff recommendation to
grant the permit request on conditions targeted to address the two identified
public impacts that are not mitigated in Durant's proposal. These
conditions include: (1) the dedication of a fifteen-foot-wide public right-of-
way along the project site's Main Street frontage, and (2) the dedication of
Durant's riparian lands and a twenty-foot-wide public right-of-way along
the upland lot's entire ocean frontage.
The former dedication along the western edge of the property would
allow for the future widening of Main Street to accommodate increases in
traffic. The latter dedications on the ocean side of the property would allow
for the commencement of beach re-nourishment, dune-building, artificial
reef installation, jetty construction, and other shore protection projects, for
these interests in Durant's tidelands and uplands are the final property
interests that need to be secured for these projects to move forward.
Together, these shore protection projects are anticipated by federal, state,
and local governmental entities, as well as some independent experts, to
safeguard Cape Surf from a two foot rise in sea level through the year
2100.56 Specifically with respect to Durant's property, these shore
protection measures will counter several impacts resulting from the
proposed development, including sand dune degradation, extension of
public infrastructure into a vulnerable area, and the possibility that, should
the structure ultimately sustain damage or destruction as a result of rising
seas, debris from the site could harm neighboring and inland residents.
C. Challenges to Imposing Exactions for the Future
The city-imposed conditions in the above hypothetical represent
"exactions for the future" in that they impose an immediate burden on
56This hypothetical assumes that Cape Surf has rejected an ecologically sensible approach
that would allow for the natural inland migration of the sea. For a particularly thought-provoking
piece in this regard, see Marc R. Poirier, A Very Clear Blue Line: Behavioral Economics, Public
Choice, Public Art and Sea Level Rise, 16 SOUTHEASTERN ENvTL. L.J. 83, 111 (2007) ("Nature
itself will have its say. . . .").
57Id. at 108 ("Sea level rise will affect many parts of the world in many different ways; but
each individual locality will be affected individually, community by community-even, one could
say, property by property .... And each community will be called to respond just as locally. The
problem can be described abstractly and generally, but it also is inevitably local and concrete.")
(footnote omitted). See also Poirier, supra note 37, at 256-58; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, COASTAL SENSITIVITY TO SEA LEVEL RISE: A Focus ON THE MID-ATLANTIC REGION
(2009).
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Durant but are designed to mitigate harm from the requested development
in a way that the benefits of the exactions will only be felt in the future.
The dedication of the fifteen-foot-wide public right-of-way along the
project site's Main Street frontage immediately deprives Durant of the
ability to exclude others from the area and to develop that area for
economic use;58 however, it will only provide a tangible benefit to the
public if and when Main Street actually is expanded. The dedication of
Durant's riparian lands and a twenty-foot-wide public right-of-way along
the upland lot's ocean frontage similarly restrains Durant's ability to
exclude and develop those areas, yet the shore protection efforts it allows
will only provide a meaningful public benefit if and when considerable sea-
level rise occurs.59
The requested dedications demonstrate that different types of exactions
for the future can present different challenges. For one, the roadway
dedication raises a land assembly issue.60 At first glance, if a city lacks all
of the required dedications to expand a particular street, one could argue
that any benefits that the city claimed stemmed from this particular
dedication would be illusory.6 1 Yet, on the other hand, it seems that the
coordinated implementation of multiple exactions, all designed to serve the
same purpose, must be executed together in order to work; indeed, if one
58 See Sam D. Starritt & John H. McClanahan, Land-Use Planning and Takings: The Viability
of Conditional Exactions to Conserve Open Space in the Rocky Mountain West after Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 415, 461 (1995) (suggesting that,
in authoring the majority opinion in Dolan, Chief Justice Rehnquist "hung his hat on the fact that
the Dolans would have lost their right to exclude from real property").
s9 These shore protection projects likely will provide some near-term protection against flash
flooding associated with coastal storms. See, e.g., James G. Titus, Does the US. Government
Realize That the Sea is Rising? How to Restructure Federal Programs So that Wetlands and
Beaches Survive, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 717, 749 (2000) (describing these types of benefits
as "incidental"). However, their primary design goal is to protect against consistent elevated
inundation.
60The ocean-side dedication does not-or at least no longer-raises this assembly issue, for
the state has acquired all other property interests necessary to commence the shore protection
projects.
61See e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 382 (1994); Simpson v. City of North
Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980) (rejecting a right-of-way exaction imposed to facilitate
street development because of substantial uncertainty regarding whether the city could acquire
other necessary exactions from surrounding properties); Burton v. Clark Cnty., 958 P.2d 343,
356-57 (1998) (rejecting a right-of-way exaction intended to connect neighborhood streets when
it was substantially uncertain whether the city could acquire a similar and equally necessary
exaction on neighboring property).
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landowner could avoid an exaction because the city had not yet obtained all
dedications necessary to improve a street immediately, no such
62improvement would ever be possible.
While the ocean-side dedications do not raise a similar assembly issue
in this case, both the roadway and ocean-side dedications present a
challenge that is consistent across all exactions for the future. That is, these
exactions are based on government projections that inherently involve some
significant degree of uncertainty.63 Here, the roadway dedication is based
on the assumption that population increase and economic conditions will
lead to the actual development of the private lands alongside the path of
Main Street's projected expansion; however, a market collapse, unexpected
alterations in development patterns, and multiple other factors could prove
that assumption false. Moreover, the roadway dedication assumes the
government will have the opportunity to exact or purchase the additional,
necessary rights-of-way from other land owners. Similarly, the ocean-side
dedication is based on scientific estimates of the rate and extent of future
sea-level rise, even though it is at least possible that new discoveries will be
made, significant climate mitigation measures will be enacted, or sensible
geo-engineering techniques will be developed, that prove those sea-level
rise estimates were exaggerated.6 4
The following Part explores two features of the U.S. Supreme Court's
exaction takings jurisprudence that presumably flow from the land
62See generally McClure v. City of Springfield, 28 P.3d 1222 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
63 The ability to foresee how development will unfold undoubtedly is complicated in a
dynamic, constantly fluctuating economy. See, e.g., See DANIEL P. SELMI, ET AL., LAND USE
REGULATION 48 (3d ed. 2008). A similar uncertainty pervades environmental policy. See David
A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1315, 1322 (2003) ("There are at least two distinct sources of unsureness in the environmental
context: (1) the difficulty of assessing whether perceived health and environmental threats
actually will result in harm, and if so, how much harm and (2) the difficulty of assessing whether
available regulatory tools and technology will in fact result in the avoidance of any harms that
might otherwise result.").
6While sea-level rise in response to warming global temperatures in the twentieth century
and the beginning of the twenty-first century has already been recorded, there admittedly remains
considerable debate as to the projected extent of the sea's rise. See, e.g., Byrne & Grannis, supra
note 3, at 8. However, sea-level rise estimates have been consistently growing, not shrinking,
with advances in predictive technologies and data collection. Moreover, it is generally agreed that
even if the global community were to halt all anthropogenic contributions to the changing climate
immediately through elimination of all greenhouse gas emissions, sea levels would continue to
rise for several decades in light of the delayed effect of those emissions already in the atmosphere.
See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group II, supra note 53, at 7-22.
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assembly and forecasting uncertainties evident in the above hypothetical.
These features of current takings law dictate that, should a landowner in a
position similar to Durant file a takings challenge to dedications that seek to
address anticipated but as-yet unknown cumulative future impacts of his
permitted development, the government could face a nearly insurmountable
hurdle.
III. EXACTIONS FOR THE FUTURE AS TAKINGS
This Part explores two ways in which the U.S. Supreme Court's
exaction takings jurisprudence's response to landowners' concerns
regarding assembly and forecasting uncertainty reflects principles that are
otherwise rejected in traditional takings jurisprudence. The first involves
the Supreme Court's abstract assertion that the government must bear the
heightened burden set out in Nollan and Dolan solely when imposing
exactions via an adjudicative process, only to ignore this assertion in
practice by applying heightened scrutiny to broadly applicable exactions
that are part of larger or long-term community plans. The second involves
the Supreme Court's errant justification for preserving the notion that
exactions must "substantially advance legitimate state interests."
A. The Relevance of Comprehensive Land-Use Planning in Takings
Law
Land-use planning broadly guides property development by establishing
the type and degree of allowable intensification of real property. It
typically reflects a community's long-term design, economic conditions,
geography, and environmental resources. 6 5  This section first briefly
explains how the existence of comprehensive planning has long served as a
basis for deference to government defendants in regulatory takings and
eminent domain cases. It then distinguishes the prominent role of planning
in these two areas of takings law from planning's rather peculiar role in
exaction takings law, where the Supreme Court has strongly insinuated-
though failed to follow-the notion that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to
exactions that are part of broad, community-wide strategies. The section
concludes by exploring the implications of the Supreme Court's artificial
treatment of the legislative-adjudicative divide for those cases involving
65 See e.g., Erin Ryan, Note, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of
Bargaining in Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 337, 344-45 (2002).
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exactions for the future.
1. Planning and Regulatory Takings
In regulatory takings disputes, the judiciary routinely defers to
governmental planning efforts, such that they are less likely to find a taking
when the challenged restriction fits within an existing comprehensive
plan. 6 The primary reason behind this leaning is that when the political
branches act comprehensively, rather than in a targeted way toward a
particular individual, it is far more likely that the "decision reflects a
thoughtful, carefully considered assessment of all relevant costs and
benefits." 67 Deference to regulation that is part of a broad plan is no more
evident than in the "polestar" 68 of modern regulatory takings doctrine, Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.69 Justice Brennan's
opinion for the majority, which concluded that no compensable taking
occurred, asserted that New York City's historic preservation law
"embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or
aesthetic interest wherever they might be found in the city." 70 The Penn
Central Court went on to establish a multi-factor balancing test centered on
the economic impact individual landowners bear in light of the reasonable
expectations associated with their investment.71
Subsequent cases continually demonstrate that the Court is quite
deferential to the government amidst evidence of planning. For instance, in
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
planning efforts to preserve the water quality of Lake Tahoe proved central
to the Court's rejection of property owners' claims that a thirty-two month
development moratorium categorically required the payment of
compensation. 72 The six-justice majority stressed the critical function of
66See, e.g., Byrne & Grannis, supra note 3, at 21; John D. Echeverria, The Triumph of
Justice Stevens and the Principle of Generality, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 22, 24 (2006); Nicole Stelle
Garnett, Planning as a Public Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 448 (2007).
67 See Echeverria, supra note 66, at 31 (suggesting that, to Justice Stevens, whether a rule
"singles out" a takings claimant is more important than the diminution in value of the claimant's
land).
6
8Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001).
69438 U.S. 104 (1978).
'old. at 132.
71 1d at 124-28.
72535 U.S. 302, 306 (2002) (framing the issue as "whether a moratorium on development
imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a per se taking
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"interim development controls," favorably citing "consensus in the planning
community" that such devices "are an essential tool of successful
development." 73 Similarly, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Court cited to
the city's "interest in assuring careful and orderly development of
residential property with provision of open-space areas," suggesting that the
benefits conferred via such a community-wide plan "must be considered
along with any diminution in market value that the [takings claimants]
might suffer." 74
2. Planning and Eminent Domain
Outside the regulatory context, there is another significant body of U.S.
Supreme Court takings jurisprudence that emphasizes planning. Planning
has led to government victories in cases surrounding the Fifth
Amendment's command that the government shall not take private property
"for public use" without providing just compensation. In Berman v.
Parker, a unanimous Court concluded that the condemnation of properties
in blight-designated areas for economic redevelopment purposes met the
"public use" requirement. Justice Douglas wrote for the Court that
"blighted or slum area[s] . . . must be planned as a whole . . .. If owner after
owner were permitted to resist[,] . . . integrated plans for redevelopment
would suffer greatly."78
Planning took on increasing significance in Kelo v. City of New
London.7 9  Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court emphasized that the
of property requiring compensation. . .").
73Id. at 337-39. Indeed, development moratoria are widely employed by land use planners
"to preserve the status quo while they formulate a more permanent development strategy." See
Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe's Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View ofProperty and Justice,
21 CONST. COMMENT. 727, 751 (2004).
74447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980). See also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 722 (1999) (affirming a takings award where "the city's denial of the final
development permit was inconsistent not only with the city's general ordinances and policies but
even with the shifting ad hoc restrictions previously imposed by the city").
75See Garnett, supra note 66, at 453-54.
76U.S. CONST. amend. V.
n 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954).
7 1Id. at 34-35 (upholding the National Capital Planning Commission's condemnation of a
non-blighted department store building because of, in part, the comprehensive nature of the
Commission's redevelopment plan).
79545 U.S. 469. As one scholar notes, "The Kelo majority mentioned the words 'plan' and
'planning' forty times; Justice Kennedy's separate opinion brought the tally to nearly fifty." See
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comprehensive nature of the City of New London's planning process
provided support for the finding that the condemnation of the residential
properties at issue furthered a public economic redevelopment purpose.so
Justice Kennedy joined the majority, but also authored a separate opinion.8 1
This separate opinion arguably went even further than the majority with
respect to the import of planning. 82  Justice Kennedy suggested that
planning very well may be the determining factor in separating
presumptively impermissible government acts from constitutional public
takings.83 While he would not engage in "conjecture" as to when such a
presumption might apply, he explained his comfort with the conclusion that
Kelo did not present such an instance. 84  As one scholar suggests,
Garnett, supra note 66, at 444.
soKelo, 545 U.S. at 483-87 ("The City has carefully formulated an economic development
plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community .... [A] one-to-one
transfer of property, executed outside the confines of an integrated development plan ... would
certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot .... ). Some scholars have noted the
irony in Justice Stevens' reliance on comprehensive planning in Kelo-which appears consistent
with the Court's reliance on planning in Penn Central-in light of the fact that Justice Stevens
joined the dissent in Penn Central. Echeverria, supra note 66, at 39-40 (suggesting Justice
Stevens' views may have "evolved over time," and querying "whether Justice Stevens, if he had it
to do all over again, would dissent in Penn Central").
8 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
82 Id. at 491.
831Id. See also Garnett, supra note 66, at 444. Kennedy's perspective echoes that of the
Illinois Supreme Court's opinion in Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City
Environmental, L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d I (Ill. 2002). In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected
a proposed condemnation of land that would be used for parking as part of an alleged economic
redevelopment plan. Id. at 10. The court declared:
[The Southwestern Illinois Development Authority] did not conduct or commission a
thorough study of the parking situation at Gateway. Nor did it formulate any economic
plan requiring [the] additional parking .... Clearly, the foundation of this taking is
rooted not in the economic and planning process with which the [Authority] has been
charged. Rather, this action was undertaken solely in response to [a private company's]
expansion goals . . .. It appears [the Authority's] true intentions were to act as a default
broker of land for [that private company's] proposed parking plan.
Id. Southwestern Illinois Development Authority provides the converse of Western Seafood Co. v.
United States, 202 F. App'x 670, 674 (5th Cir. 2006), where the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit rejected a landowner's claim that the government's asserted public purpose was pretextual
because the government's significant planning measures mirrored those of New London in Kelo.
8Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("This taking occurred in the context of a
comprehensive development plan meant to address a serious citywide depression, and the
projected economic benefits of the project cannot be characterized as de minimis."). In hindsight,
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"[G]ovemment officials [post-Kelo] will view planning as a constitutional
safe harbor and private litigants will consider a lack of planning a
constitutional red flag."85
In the wake of Kelo, many lower courts have embraced planning as an
important factor in "public use" analyses.86 For example, in determining
whether the taking of a farm was for a legitimate recreational purpose, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found the fact that there was no
"suggestion that the Township has considered, let alone created, such a
plan" militated heavily against the government's position.87 Likewise, the
Maryland Supreme Court avowed that failure to provide evidence of a
comprehensive economic redevelopment plan acts as a de facto indication
of a condemnation's illegitimacy.
3. Planning and Exaction Takings
Dolan seemingly found it important to distinguish "legislative
determinations classifying entire areas of the city" from the "adjudicative
decision" to "condition [an] application for a building permit on an
individual parcel."89 That is, the Court strongly implied-if not expressly
declared-that the strictures of Dolan (and by implication Nollan) are
the City of New London's planning efforts-which were based at least in part on the promise of
Pfizer constructing its headquarters on a parcel of land adjacent to the condemned properties at
issue in the case-has been significantly criticized after Pfizer decided to relocate its plant outside
of New London. See, e.g., Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer to Leave City That Won Land-Use Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/nyregion/
t3pfizer.html. However, the failure of the development plan in New London very well may not
have been due to poor planning projections, but instead due to the cloud of the Kelo litigation
itself See, e.g., Tom Blumer, Pfizer Leaving New London CT; Just Don't Mention Kelo While
Reporting It, NEWSBUSTERS (Nov. 10, 2009) http://newsbusters.org/blogs/tom-blumer/2009/1 1/
10/pfizer-leaving-new-london-ct-just-dont-mention-kelo-while-reporting-it. Yet, at least for
"public use" purposes, it seems of little import that the government's plan proved prescient in any
particular case, but rather whether the governmental entity had a sensible basis for the contours of
its plan at the outset.
"See Garnett, supra note 66, at 454.
16See, e.g., Ilya Somin, The Judicial Reaction to Kelo, 4 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 1, 28 (2011).
87See Middletown Twp. v. Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331, 338-39 (Pa. 2007) (noting that, in
Kelo, "the United States Supreme Court placed great weight upon the existence of a 'carefully
considered' development plan . . .").
88See Mayor of Baltimore v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324, 356 (Md. 2007) ("[W]hile economic
development may be a public purpose, it must be carried out pursuant to a comprehensive plan.").
89Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
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inapplicable to exactions that are part of a community plan and broadly
applicable. 90 In discussing its exactions jurisprudence in a subsequent
decision, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., the Court described Nollan and
Dolan as involving "adjudicative land-use exactions-specifically,
government demands that a landowner dedicate an easement allowing
public access to her property as a condition of obtaining a development
permit." 91 Several scholars have explained that this passage from Lingle, as
well as dicta several years prior in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd. ,92 seemingly echo the divide arguably set out in Dolan.9 3
90See id
9'544 U.S. 528, 546-47 (2005).
92526 U.S. 687 (1999).
93 See, e.g., Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra note 17, at 754-55; Fenster, Takings
Formalism, supra note 17, at 628 (citing Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 702) (suggesting that dicta
in Del Monte Dunes "seemed to limit nexus and proportionality to a subset of land use conditions"
that are adjudicative in nature); Benjamin S. Kingsley, Making It Easy to Be Green: Using Impact
Fees to Encourage Green Building, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 532, 560-61 (2008); Timothy M.
Mulvaney, The Remnants ofExaction Takings, 33 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 189, at 212-
14 (2010) (suggesting that there is a strong implication in the U.S. Supreme Court's unanimous
2005 opinion in Lingle that the Nollan and Dolan tests do not apply to conditions imposed through
the legislative process); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24
CARDOZO L. REv. 93, 107 n.55 (2002) (contending that Del Monte Dunes limits the application of
Nollan and Dolan to individualized determinations); Daniel L. Siegel, Exactions After Lingle:
How Basing Nollan and Dolan on the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Limits Their Scope,
28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 577, 608-609, 612. But see J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the
"Essential Nexus ": How State and Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where
They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 373, 401-02 (2002); James S. Burling &
Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary Zoning and Other Legislative and
Monetary Exactions, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 407-17 (2009) (arguing that Lingle supports
subjecting legislatively-imposed exactions to heightened judicial scrutiny); David L. Callies &
Christopher T. Goodin, The Status ofNollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City
of Tigard After Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 40 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 539, 563-64 (2007);
Steven J. Eagle, Del Monte Dunes, Good Faith, and Land Use Regulation, 30 ENVTL. L. REP.
10100, 10104 (2000) ("It seems highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would unanimously
declare through dicta in Del Monte Dunes that the Dolan 'rough proportionality' principle should
not develop to meet the exigencies of cases as they arise, much less to deal with deliberate
municipal circumventions."); Christopher T. Goodin, Comment, Dolan v. City of Tigard and the
Distinction Between Administrative and Legislative Exactions: "A Distinction Without A
Constitutional Difference, " 28 U. HAW. L. REv. 139, 158-67 (2005); Steven A. Haskins, Closing
the Dolan Deal-Bridging the Legislative/Adjudicative Divide, 38 URB. LAW. 487, 501-21 (2006)
(arguing that the Takings Clause does not distinguish between branches of government, such that
legislative and adjudicative exactions should receive the same level of judicial scrutiny). Justices
O'Connor and Thomas exhibited a preference for the latter view in dissenting from the Court's
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Understandably, the U.S. Supreme Court's rhetoric has led many lower
courts to conclude that Nollan and Dolan's "nexus" and "proportionality"
tests do not apply to generally applicable exactions, but rather only to those
individualized exactions imposed through an adjudicative process. 94
Such a text-based argument is buttressed by the rather persuasive claim
that legislative exactions present considerably less risk of extortion-like
government action than adjudicative exactions.95  Legislatively-authorized
denial of a petition for certiorari in a matter where the Georgia Supreme Court declared that the
heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan is not applicable to legislatively-imposed exactions, but
only to those that are adjudicatively-imposed. See Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta,
515 U.S. 1116, 1117-19 (1995) (Thomas, J. & O'Connor, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari).
94See, e.g., Wolf Ranch, LLC v. City of Colorado Springs, 207 P.3d 875, 880 (Colo. App.
2008), aff'd, 220 P.3d 559 (Colo. 2009) (holding that legislatively formulated exactions applying
to broad classes of landowners do not require a showing of an essential nexus and rough
proportionality); McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
that the Nollan and Dolan tests are inapplicable to cases that do not involve individual,
adjudicative decisions nor the physical appropriation of private land). But see B.A.M. Dev.,
L.L.C. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 128 P.3d 1161, 1170-71 (Utah 2006) (holding that prior to the
enactment of a Utah statute codifying a "rough proportionality" treatment of all development
exactions, Nollan and Dolan applied to both adjudicative decisions and general land-use
ordinances). The Supreme Court of Maine concluded that the legislative nature of an exaction is
just one factor in determining whether the Nollan and Dolan tests are applicable. See Curtis v.
Town of South Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657, 660 (Me. 1998) ("Our inquiry into rough
proportionality does not end at this legislative determination, but we assign weight to the fact that
the easement requirement derives from a legislative rule of general applicability and not an ad hoc
determination made by the planning board at the time of the pending application.").
95 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited,
86 IOWA L. REv. 1, 84 (2000) ("Judicial limits on land use bargains stem from a well-meaning
protective impulse and a healthy skepticism of government. . . ."). Thomas Merrill offers an
alternative perspective. He suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court's heavy policing of permit
conditions-apparently adjudicative or otherwise-may be justified by the fact that the exercise of
the constitutional right at issue-the right to receive just compensation-comes with the
concomitant public benefit of preventing the government from accumulating an "inefficiently
large stockpile of land." See Merrill, supra note 36, at 869-79. See also Daniel A. Farber, Free
Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 574-
75 (1991) ("Why should [a government] employee not be allowed to contract away his speech
rights freely? The answer . .. is that speech about government is a public good."). Merrill
distinguishes cases raising this "stockpiling of land" concern from those cases in which judges
perceive that an individual decision to waive a constitutional right has little bearing on the public,
i.e., when there are few if any external benefits associated with the right at issue. Merrill, supra
note 36, at 871-74. It is not clear whether or how this "constitutional rights as public goods"




exactions are not necessarily the same as exactions that are part of a
comprehensive planning scheme, for the "weight" of land use plans varies
widely across jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions require that all zoning and
other land use decisions demonstrate strict consistency with adopted plans,
making the distinction between planning-based and legislatively-authorized
exactions insignificant. 9 6  Others, however, suggest that plans can be
inferred from a collection of land use decisions made by a municipality 97 or
that even a zoning ordinance itself can embody the "plan," 98 such that
comprehensive plans do not necessarily place specific parameters on
exaction decisions in these jurisdictions. But the point here is that, whether
exactions are classified as legislatively authorized or as components of a
comprehensive land use plan, they generally comport with the fundamental
land use policies of the community. In other words, these exactions are part
of planning process that assesses local needs and objectives on a broader
scale than merely a case-by-case basis.99
As Mark Fenster explains, "an individualized process [for imposing
exactions] poses a greater risk of an unfair bargaining process [when
compared to legislative exactions] that will result in an undue burden falling
on a property owner. [Only] [w]hen that risk is highest [do] the nexus and
proportionality tests apply." 00 This is so, as many scholars have suggested,
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 30-A, § 4352(2) (2011) ("A zoning ordinance must be
pursuant to and consistent with a comprehensive plan adopted by the municipal legislative
body. . . ."). Amidst further evidence of the significance of planning, some federal funding-
including, for instance, funding for urban renewal-is tied to local and state governments
producing comprehensive plans.
97See, e.g., Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 902 (N.Y. 1968).
98See, e.g., Konigsberg v. Board of Alderman, 930 A.2d 1, 19 (Conn. 2007).
99See Udell, 235 N.E.2d at 900-01.
00Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra note 17, at 755. But see Goodin, supra note 93, at
162 ("The argument that regulatory leveraging presents substantially less of a threat in the context
of Legislative Exactions . . . is merely wishful thinking. . . ."). If Dolan actually does abandon
the traditional presumption of constitutionality made in the course of adjudication, but not in the
course of legislation, the Court did not explain why it was doing so. Steven Johnson suggests:
When the judiciary reviews non-constitutional challenges to an agency action, the court
accords the same level of deference to the agency's decision regardless of whether the
decision is made through adjudication or a rulemaking. Therefore, it is not clear why
the level of deference accorded to the agency on constitutional questions should vary
depending on whether the agency acted pursuant to its legislative or adjudicative
authority.
Steven M. Johnson, Avoid, Minimize, Mitigate: The Continuing Constitutionality of Wetlands
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because any community discomfort with exactions that are broadly
applicable-like all other widespread laws-are subject to voter revolt
through the ballot box.o'0 As one commentator describes it, "[w]here a city
or county seeks to impose a condition across the board on thousands of
property owners, [the property owners] are likely to have a say in the
process."' 02
However, despite this apparent doctrinal and theoretical support for the
legislative-adjudicative distinction, the distinction may suffer from two
deficiencies. First, where conditions are not imposed on "thousands" but
nevertheless have some breadth of applicability, drawing a line between
"legislative" and "adjudicative" exactions is an extremely difficult task.103
For example, certain development impacts today-including wetland and
traffic impacts-are conducive in some ways to planning-based, broadly
applicable exaction formulas.1 04 Still, particularly in the wetlands context,
such formulas cannot be too specific, in light of the multitude of variables
associated with lost and created or restored wetland functionality (as
opposed to sheer acreage) that must be considered in evaluating the
adequacy of wetlands mitigation.0 s
Mitigation after Dolan v. City of Tigard, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. Rev. 689, 719 (1994).
0 1See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 93. at 611. See also Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford
Estates Ltd. P'ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 641 (Tex. 2004) (suggesting that it is "entirely possible that
the government could 'gang up' on particular groups to force extractions that a majority of
constituents would not only tolerate but applaud, so long as burdens they would otherwise bear
were shifted to others"); Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 208-09 ("By adopting ordinances embracing
development impact fee regimes, local governments simultaneously achieve a series of attractive
political objectives, and they do so without having to consider any potential objections from
interest groups unrepresented in the existing voting populace.").
1
02 See Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra note 17, at 754 ("The act of singling out a
property owner for an individualized regulation makes the condition more suspect."); Siegel,
supra note 93, at 611.
103 Fenster contends that the legislative-adjudicative line is particularly difficult to draw at the
local level "where elected officials, who have less expertise than the typical federal and state
administrative agency, make both legislative regulatory commands and administrative regulatory
decisions, and where the legislative process is more subject to the political process failures of
majoritarianism and factionalism." Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra note 17, at 772. See
also Ball & Reynolds, supra note 4, at 1562.
14Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra note 17, at 766-67.
'osSee Johnson, supra note 100, at 720-21; Titus, supra note 59, at 763. See also B.A.M.
Dcv., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 87 P.3d 710, 728 n.23 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) ("[S]ome exactions
are somewhere in the middle of adjudicative and legislative because the legislature may give some
guidelines, while the administrative body retains considerable discretion as well." (internal
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Is the application of, say, an ordinance establishing a wetlands
mitigation formula "adjudicative" when that ordinance is put into
operation-and conceivably negotiated, at least at the marginsl06_in
individual permitting cases? 07  If so, then very few exactions could be
classified as legislative;'0 8 further, a significant portion of those that were-
imagine a requirement that all development permits include a condition
requiring a precise number (as opposed to a percentage) of affordable
housing set-asides regardless of the size and scope of the permitted
development-very well could be vulnerable to a host of other legal
challenges. This resolution seems unworkable. On the other hand, if the
application of exaction formulas is considered "legislative," then it
presumably would take little effort by elected officials to legislate Nollan
and Dolan into near irrelevance by adopting broad blueprints under which
permitting officials could continue to exercise at least some modicum of
discretion while immune from "nexus" and "proportionality" review. 109 if
"adjudicative" exactions included only unusually particularized exactions
that are disconnected from any formula, plan, or policy, it seems the
distinction between broadly applicable and adjudicative exactions could be
fairly implemented; otherwise, the distinction is dispositively manipulable,
which, as explained in the remainder of this section, is evident in Nollan
and Dolan themselves.
The second deficiency, then, that the legislative-adjudicative distinction
suffers from in the exactions context is perhaps more pressing should the
quotations omitted)), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 128 P.3d 1161 (Utah 2006). In some sense,
"every land use regulation ultimately must apply to individual parcels in specific factual
contexts." See Michael B. Kent, Jr., Theoretical Tension and Doctrinal Discord: Analyzing
Development Impact Fees as Takings, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1833, 1862 (2010).
106 See, e.g., Edward J. Sullivan, Dolan and Municipal Risk Assessment, 12 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 1, 30 (1997) ("[Exaction] formula[s] should have some flexibility of application, so that if
there are particular instances of inequitable application, an administrative process is available to
smooth out the roughness of proportionality.").
07See, e.g., St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2011)
(involving a landowner's claim that the application of a 10:1 wetlands mitigation ratio ran afoul of
Nollan and Dolan).
1os See Ball & Reynolds, supra note 4, at 1563-64.
'o'See id. at 1566-67 (suggesting that the legislative-adjudicative distinction is
"underinclusive" because the lack of discretion in formula-based exactions schemes can lead to
more, not less, landowner hardship, for individualized exactions can act like waivers of otherwise
onerous regulations under which the requested development would simply be denied); Dana,
supra note 40, at 1300.
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Supreme Court ever agree to definitively decide the issue; that is, the
legislative-adjudicative distinction is arguably belied by Nollan and
Dolan's facts. The Nollan majority paid little heed to the fact that the
claimant purchased property in an area subject to an existing public access
enhancement policy adopted pursuant to the California Coastal Act.10 In
accord with this policy, the state's Coastal Commission required that all
similarly situated owners facilitate the exercise of public trust rights by
conferring a public walking corridor along the water's edge as a condition
to new development."' And in Dolan, the city imposed the same
obligations on the plaintiff that were required of all approved development
"within and adjacent to the 100-year floodplain."l 2 It was the legislative
dedication requirement itself-not an adjudicative decision designating the
amount of land to be dedicated-that the Dolan Court found
constitutionally infirm."'
Moreover, each of the five state cases Dolan cited as the foundation for
its "rough proportionality" test involved what easily could be considered
legislative exactions.'14 In Collis v. City of Bloomington, a Minnesota court
upheld a municipal ordinance requiring a dedication of land or donation of
money for parks and playgrounds because there was a reasonable
relationship between the conditioned approval of the subdivision and the
city's need for land.' '5 In City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., a
Texas court found constitutional a city ordinance requiring either dedication
of parkland or money in lieu thereof when subdividing land since it was
"oCAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30212(a) (West 2007). See also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825, 857-58 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Coastal Commission Interpretative
Guidelines make clear that fulfillment of the Commission's constitutional and statutory duty
requires that the approval of new coastline development be conditioned upon provisions ensuring
lateral public access to the ocean.").
11 See Dana, supra note 40, at 1283-84.
11
2 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379 ("The City Planning Commission...
granted petitioner's permit application subject to conditions imposed by the city's [Community
Development Code]."). See also Johnson, supra note 100, at 720 n. 172.
"'See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
l4 Likewise, an oft-cited passage in Nollan-where the Court suggested that the California
Coastal Commission's exaction amounted to an "out-and-out plan of extortion"--quotes an
opinion of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in a case involving a legislatively-imposed
monetary exaction. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (1987) (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of
Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981), overruled by Town of Auburn v. McEvoy, 553 A.2d
371 (N.H. 1988)).
"'246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Minn. 1976).
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"substantially related" to the health, safety, and general welfare of the
public.' 16 In Call v. City of West Jordan, a Utah court upheld an ordinance
requiring dedication of seven percent of land proposed for subdivision to
the city (or payment of an equivalent fee in lieu thereof) to be used for flood
control or recreational facilities for the benefit of the city's citizens because
there was "some reasonable relationship to the needs created by the
subdivision."' 17  In Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, a Wisconsin
court upheld an ordinance requiring the dedication of land for schools or
parks as a condition of subdivision approval in "the absence of
contravening evidence" set forth by the sub-divider that the government's
action lacked a "reasonable basis."' And in Simpson v. City of North
Platte, a Nebraska court found that a city ordinance requiring, as a
condition of a building permit, a forty-foot right-of-way to be used at some
indefinite point violated the state's constitution because the property owner
proved that the condition lacked any "reasonable relationship" to his
requested construction.1 9
4. Planning and Takings Cases Involving Exactions for the
Future
That Dolan cited the Simpson case favorably is telling. It is the only
one of the many opinions cited by the Dolan majority as support for the
"rough proportionality" standard where a state court actually found that an
exaction violated a constitutional command. To expound on the brief
description above, the dispute in Simpson involved a city ordinance that
required developers seeking to erect or enlarge buildings to dedicate half of
the adjacent street, as measured by the projected width of that street set
forth in the city's comprehensive plan.12 0 Simpson leased property with the
intention of constructing a fast-food restaurant on it, and challenged the
ordinance as violative of the Nebraska Constitution's Takings Clause.121
"'680 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. 1984).
117606 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979). The court went on to declare that the ordinance "will
redound to the benefit of the subdivision as well as to the general welfare of the whole
community," but that "[t]he fact that it does so, rather than solely benefiting the individual
subdivision, does not impair the validity of the ordinance." Id
"' 137 N.W.2d 442, 447 (Wis. 1965).
'19292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980).
12 ld. at 299.
121 Compared to its federal counterpart, the language of the Nebraska Constitution's "Takings
Clause" is particularly broad: "The property of no person shall be taken or damaged for public
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According to the court, "none of the real estate [for the extension of that
street] has been acquired by the City nor is there any indication as to when,
if ever, such real estate will be acquired by the City." 2 2 The matter, then,
involved an exaction that sought to address anticipated future public
harms-the cumulative threats to public health and safety associated with
traffic congestion that would result from projected future development on
adjacent lands-to which Simpson would contribute.' 2 3 Seen in this light,
the only lower court takings finding that Dolan cited with favor involved an
exaction for the future.
While the Dolan majority offered surface praise to long-term
planning-the Court called the task of land use planning "commendable"
and the city's goals "laudable"l 2 4 -it simultaneously ignored the
longstanding judicial deference to the practice.1 2 5  Nollan and Dolan 's
use without just compensation therefor." NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 21 (emphasis added). The Federal
Constitution's Takings Clause states: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Nebraska Supreme Court asserted at
the time that Simpson need not-indeed, could not-request a variance under the ordinance and
then later challenge that ordinance as unconstitutional. Simpson, 292 N.W.2d at 302 ("The
Simpsons were correct in refusing to seek a variance and, instead, testing the constitutionality of
the ordinance."). However, it is likely that, today, a landowner in Simpson's position would have
to pursue said variance in light of the exhaustion and finality requirements set forth by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 193 (1985).
122 Simpson, 292 N.W.2d at 300. The Simpson court favorably cited a pre-Nollan New Jersey
appellate decision, wherein the New Jersey court said:
In short, for the [reasonable relationship] test to apply, thus making a compulsory
dedication constitutionally valid, the nexus must be rational. This means it must be
substantial, demonstrably clear and present. It must definitely appear that the proposed
action by the developer will either forthwith or in the demonstrably immediate future so
burden the abutting road, through increased traffic or otherwise, as to require its
accelerated improvement. Such dedication must be for specific and presently
contemplated immediate improvements-not for the purpose of "banking" the land for
use in a projected but unscheduled possible future use.
Id. at 301 (quoting 181 Inc. v. Salem Cnty. Planning Bd., 336 A.2d 501, 506 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1975)).
123 See Simpson, 292 N.W.2d at 299.
1
2 4 See Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994).
25 That is, the Dolan Court explicitly pronounced what was implicit in Nollan: it departed
from the general rule applicable to zoning and other land use controls that the burden properly
rests on the challenging party to prove that the regulatory act at issue arbitrarily restricts a
property right. Id. at 391 n.8. Instead, the Court declared that the government-as the
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disregard for the role of exactions within a larger community scheme
illuminates a rather extreme consequence: lower courts facing exaction
takings claims may be prompted not only to ignore but to demonstrate an
aversion to long-term planning. In effect, the finding of takings liability in
exactions for the future cases faults governmental entities for over-planning.
In this way, the requirement that exactions bear immediate fruit creates
a near per se rule against using exactions for the future to counter particular
types of development impacts. This categorical rule emanates from the fact
that it is almost impossible for governmental entities to meet the level of
proof required in instances like those involving Branch Durant's
development proposal in the hypothetical set out in Part II. Such is the case
because there necessarily is some uncertainty in projecting the success of
future land assembly (or overall community need) for roadway expansion,
as well as the specific amount of public burdens forecast to occur from the
applied-for development as a result of sea-level rise. In practice, then, the
formalistic, demanding criterion of exaction takings law allows the
imposition of exactions for only those burdens that are easily quantifiable in
the present.126 Demanding that local governments on limited budgets pay
takings compensation for the likes of traffic-reducing rights-of-way and
safety-inducing shore protection measures for future public benefit could
allow some impacts of intensified land uses to go unmitigated.
As one scholar predicts, "Since Kelo encourages planning, more
defendant-bears the burden to justify the required exactions. Id. The Dolan majority's decision
to abandon the traditional standard of deference afforded to local governments that have
conducted considerable planning was not lost on Justice Stevens. In dissent, Justice Stevens
asserted, "The Court has made a serious error by abandoning the traditional presumption of
constitutionality and imposing a novel burden of proof on a city implementing an admittedly valid
comprehensive land use plan." See id. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' barb
elicited only a conclusory response from the majority: "Justice Stevens' dissent takes us to task
for placing the burden on the city . . .. He is correct in arguing that in evaluating most generally
applicable zoning regulations, the burden properly rests on the party challenging the
regulation .... Here, by contrast, the city made an adjudicative decision .... In this situation,
the burden properly rests on the city." Id at 391 n.8. As discussed supra note 100, the Court did
not explain why the traditional presumption of constitutionality should not apply to adjudicative
decisions.
126For a rare decision that arguably suggests the contrary, see Oregon ex rel. Dep't of Transp.
v. Altimus, 905 P.2d 258 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) ("We do not think that Dolan requires the exclusion
of all evidence of hypothetical conditions in circumstances .. . where it is relevant and responsive
to evidence of potential development impacts and where the degree of proportionality is
necessarily as 'speculative' as is the potential nature and existence of the hypothetical impacts and
exactions themselves.").
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planning will occur." 2 7 But governmental entities seeking to employ the
exactions tool to address cumulative future impacts have to walk a dizzying
line: they presumably must search for a level of planning that is enough so
as not to trigger traditional regulatory takings or "public use" concerns, but
at the same time not too much planning so as to avoid triggering exaction
takings liability.
B. Delineating Takings and Due Process Review
This section explains the second way in which the U.S. Supreme
Court's exaction takings jurisprudence responds to landowners' concerns
regarding assembly and forecasting uncertainty by adopting an approach
that otherwise has been rejected in modem takings law. The relationship
between due process and takings analyses has gone through several
iterations over time.12 8 As this fluctuation provides an important backdrop
for the analysis herein, the section first explains how the Court's exaction
takings decisions now stand atop a jurisprudentially uncomfortable fence
that divides due process and takings review. As one scholar asserts, Nollan
and Dolan 's inquiry into regulatory reasons and reasonableness "smacks of
constitutional Due Process" by requiring that exactions "substantially
advance legitimate state interests."l29 The section then examines the
Court's recent effort in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., to preserve this due
process-like inquiry inherent in its exactions jurisprudence. In Lingle, the
Court suggested that Nollan and Dolan do not task courts with inquiring
whether exactions substantially advance some legitimate state interest but
only whether they substantially advance the same legitimate state interest
that is threatened by the proposed development project.130 The section
concludes that takings decisions involving exactions for the future
demonstrate that this "some"/"same" distinction is difficult to justify.
1. Early Due Process and Takings Fusion
During America's first century, only physical appropriation of real or
personal property by the government was considered constitutionally
127 See Garnett, supra note 66, at 461.
128 See infra notes 131-176 and accompanying text.
129 See Fenster, supra note 54, manuscript at 10.
13oSee Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547.
5432012]
544 BAYLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:2
prohibited without the payment of compensation. 13 1 Yet the concept of
constitutionally protected property changed in the late 1800s. First, the
U.S. Supreme Court began to find compensable takings when government
action rendered property unusable. 132 More significantly in that era, the
Court began developing a body of jurisprudence under which the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of property against deprivation without
due process of law imposed substantive limits on economic regulations.13 3
While this period for development of substantive limitations on economic
regulations is most commonly associated with the U.S. Supreme Court's
1905 invalidation of a state law restricting the number of hours that a baker
could work in Lochner v. New York,13 4 the Court invalidated nearly two
hundred economic regulations in the first three decades of the 1900s.'13
Lochner merely "symbolize[s] an era of conservative judicial
intervention ... seeking to stem the flow of social and economic reform."l 3 6
According to the Lochner-era Supreme Court, "the 'letter and spirit' of the
Constitution protected property from the legislature's 'meddlesome
interferences.""
37
13 1See, e.g., Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. 418, 437 (1823) (finding that the regrading of a
roadway that caused significant damage to an adjacent house through the removal of lateral
support did not amount to an unconstitutional taking). Writing for the Court in 1992, Justice
Scalia reiterated this historical detail. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014
(U.S. 1992) ("Prior to Justice Holmes's exposition in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, it was
generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a 'direct appropriation' of property, or the
functional equivalent of a 'practical ouster of the owner's possession."') (internal citations
omitted). For excellent contemporary scholarship on this period, see, for example, MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 71-74, 132 (1977); McUsic,
supra note 36, at 612; Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the
Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 216-217 (1984);
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understandings of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995).
132Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177-78 (1871) (holding that permanent flooding
authorized by legislation constituted a compensable taking).
133 See McUsic, supra note 36, at 612-14.
134 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
13 See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT, 67-120 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 4th ed. 2005); ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 117-37
(1987).
36Cox, supra note 135, at 131.
McUsic, supra note 36, at 611 (quoting Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 23 (1915);
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61).
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Economic value-"expected earning power,"' 3 8 taxes on real estate
income, 1 39 the ability to contract to acquire land,14 0 service contracts, 1 4 1
etc.-became the metric of property. Regulations affecting that value
deprived individuals of property without due process of law, which was
equivalent in the Court's view to "taking" property.142 As economic value
necessarily is rooted in property owners' expectations, the constitutional
protection of such value conceivably could have frozen the common law in
its tracks in this way: because legislative alterations of common law
principles would affect owners' expectations, such alterations theoretically
could be considered unconstitutional.14 3
However, the Court did not go so far. Instead, while it invalidated a
significant number of laws, as noted above,14 4 it also affirmed many other
legislative acts modifying the common law, declaring such acts to be
appropriate exercises of the "police power" to safeguard the health, safety,
and welfare of the public.14 5 In essence, then, the Lochner era's judicial
intervention fusing takings and due process analysis (i.e., "meddlesome
interferences" versus the "police power") bore two traits: (1) it entailed a
considerable degree of judicial scrutiny of the relationship between the
regulatory approach and the regulatory goals (means-ends), and (2) it
138See John R. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism 16 (1924) (discussing the
Supreme Court's holding in Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418
(1890)).
139 See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 618 (1895).
140See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 (1898).
141See Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of the D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923).
142MCUSiC supra note 36, at 614 ("The criteria for determining when the state deprived an
individual of a due-process-protected property right became interchangeable with the criteria for
determining when private property had been taken.").
143 See, e.g., Tyson & Brother-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418,
429 (1927) (holding that a rate regulation impairs an owner's ability to fix the price at which
property is sold or used-an "inherent attribute of the property itself').
144See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
145 See, e.g., Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 90 (1890) ("[A]s to the enjoyment of
property, the rule is general that it must be accompanied with such limitations as will not impair
the equal enjoyment by others of their property."); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69
(1887) ("A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are deduced, by valid
legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just
sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit."); Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876) ("Under [the police power] the government regulates the conduct
of its citizens one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property,
when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good.").
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required a significant connection between the harm caused by a particular
property owner and the burdens of regulation that that property owner bore
(cause-and-effect). 14 6
In the mid-1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned the searching
federal judicial review of many economic regulations under the rubric of
substantive due process.147  The Court asserted it would overturn, on due
process grounds, only those regulations that fail to rest "upon some rational
basis."14 8 Yet it did not explicitly reject a more probing review under the
Takings Clause,14 9 leaving unclear whether takings analysis would revert to
its original and narrow focus on physical appropriations; maintain its link to
the now abandoned, probing due process review; or blaze a new trail.150
The dawn of modern regulatory takings jurisprudence in the late 1970s
at least proved that the Takings Clause would not be confined to its original
scope.' 5' In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the U.S.
Supreme Court suggested in dicta that substantive, means-ends review of a
regulation's validity might continue to be appropriate in takings analyses.15 2
Two years later, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, a unanimous Court drew on
Penn Central's dicta to declare that a land use regulation restricting
development density did not constitute a taking. 53  The Agins Court
explained that its holding rested on the finding that the regulation at issue
"substantially advanced" the legitimate state interest of discouraging
"premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space land to urban
146 MCUSiC, supra note 36, at 620-32.
14 7 See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,400 (1937).
148United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). Indeed, for nearly sixty
years, the Court did not overturn legislation under this standard, a streak that ended with the
Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
149Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922) (asserting that regulations that go
"too far" amount to unconstitutional takings).
1
50As John Echeverria explains, "Because the Takings Clause was not a primary vehicle for
searching judicial review of economic regulations in the Lochner era, takings doctrine never
underwent the revisionist interpretation that the Due Process Clause did." See John D. Echeverria,
Does a Regulation that Fails to Advance a Legitimate Governmental Interest Result in a
Regulatory Taking?, 29 ENVTL. L. 853, 879 (1999).
151 See Fenster, Constitutional Shadow, supra note 17, at 759.
152438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) ("It is, of course, implicit... that a use restriction on real
property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
public purpose .... ).
5 3 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-62 (1980).
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uses." 54
The Agins' Court asserted that its "substantially advance" test derived,
at least in part, from two Lochner-era land use cases.155  Agins' Lochner-
like melding of the Takings and Due Process Clauses produced the
following result: the judiciary, in adjudicating a takings claim, could
invalidate and enjoin legislation on the basis that the law does not
"substantially advance a legitimate state interest," without regard to whether
the challenged legislation diminishes the economic value or usefulness of
any property.' 56  This judicial power threatened a reinstitution of the
intrusive, late-nineteenth and early twentieth century review of regulatory
efforts through the guise of the Takings Clause.15 7
After more than two decades of select scholarly commentary criticizing
Agins's errant, outdated mixture of due process and takings analyses,'5 8 the
Court finally-and unanimously-admitted its error.'5 9  The 2005 case of
154id. at 261.
issId at 261-62.
15 See Echeverria, supra note 150, at 877.
'"Id. at 879.
158See, e.g., Kenneth Bley, Substantive Due Process and Land Use: the Alternative to a
Takings Claim, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS
AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS 289, 291 (David L. Callies ed., 1996); John D. Echeverria & Sharon
Dennis, The Takings Issue and the Due Process Clause: A Way out of a Doctrinal Confusion, 17
VT. L. REV. 695, 696 (1993); Echeverria, supra note 150, at 854; Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the
Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 714 (2002); Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 1600, 1605-14 (1988); Kenneth Salzberg, "Takings" as Due Process, or Due Process as
"Takings"?, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 414 (2002); Richard L. Settle, Regulatory Taking Doctrine
in Washington: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 339, 351-52
(1989). Justice Kennedy had, a decade before Lingle, suggested the same. See E. Enters. v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)
(suggesting that in instances where the constitutionality of legislation turns on "the legitimacy of
Congress' judgment rather than on the availability of compensation . . . the more appropriate
constitutional analysis arises under general due process principles rather than under the Takings
Clause.... [The Court should] reserv[e] takings analysis for cases where the governmental action
is otherwise permissible."). See also id. at 554-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[A]t the heart of the
[Takings] Clause lies a concern, not with preventing arbitrary or unfair government action, but
with providing compensation for legitimate government action that takes 'private property' to
serve the 'public' good.... [T]here is no need to torture the Takings Clause [to house claims of
arbitrariness that have a] natural home in the Due Process Clause . . . .").
159At oral argument, Justice Scalia suggested the court was going to have to "eat crow" in
rejecting the twenty-five year-old Agins test. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (No. 04-163). Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
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Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., an opinion authored by Justice O'Connor,
explicitly abandoned the Agins test for regulatory takings purposes.160
Post-Lingle, it now seems relatively clear that, at least in most instances,
the validity of government action is a due process inquiry that necessarily is
precedent to a takings analysis.16 1 Lingle's separation of due process and
takings analyses is important for several reasons. First, a successful takings
claim mandates a financial remedy,' 6 2 while a successful due process claim
results in injunctive relief.163 Second, whether a challenge to government
action is brought on a due process theory or a takings theory may affect the
types of defenses that are available to the regulating entity.16 4 Third, the
elimination of "substantial advancement" takings claims relegates most
challenges to the merits of governmental action to the judiciary's
substantive due process jurisprudence and the attendant deferential rational
basis review.' 6 5 If a regulation fails a means-ends test and is thus illegal on
a due process (or any other) basis, that finding very well may preclude
takings liability because no amount of compensation should be able to
authorize an invalid action.166
unanimous Court opened, "On occasion, a would-be doctrinal rule or test [here, the "substantially
advance" test] finds its way into our case law through simple repetition of a phrase-however
fortuitously coined." Lingle, 544 U.S. at 531. The decision concludes, "Twenty-five years ago,
the Court posited that a regulation of private property 'effects a taking if it does not substantially
advance a legitimate state interest.' The lower courts in this case took that statement to its logical
conclusion, and in so doing, revealed its imprecision. Today we correct course." Id. at 548
(internal citation omitted).
160,d.
1 Id at 543.
162 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 314 (1987). Where a claimant is successful in challenging an exaction as an
unconstitutional taking, the compensation due theoretically should amount only to the extent of
the excess, not the fair market value of the exacted property as a whole.
See, e.g., Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
'6See Echeverria, supra note 150, at 880.
165 However, to the extent the "substantially advance" test remains viable for some takings
purposes, the required fit between the government's means and its ends may be stronger-and
thus demand more from the government-than the required fit for due process purposes. See id
at 878 ("[T]he [due process/takings] label might matter if, in affirming the means-ends test as part
of takings analysis, the Supreme Court were to formulate the test to be more demanding of
government than the modern, deferential due process means-ends test.").
166See id. at 876-77. Some might suggest that a claimant could waive a challenge to the
validity of the governmental act in order to proceed with a takings claim. However, such a theory
arguably is belied by the possibility of a third party challenging the validity of that same act in a
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2. The Due Process Footing of Exaction Takings Jurisprudence
Though the Supreme Court had not relied on the "substantially
advance" test in many takings disputes after Agins, the test did serve a
principal role in both Nollan and Dolan.'6 7  Seemingly, both Nollan and
Dolan indicated that governmental demands lacking sufficient reasons can
constitute a compensable taking of property, which is specifically what the
Lingle Court subsequently said was not an appropriate takings yardstick.168
In Nollan, the Court described the "substantially advance" test as
scrutinizing (1) whether the regulatory act achieves its stated purpose 69 and
(2) whether there is a significant link between the regulatory burden the
landowner bears and the harm to the public caused by that landowner.170
Dolan formalized and strengthened the latter requirement by concluding
that it is not enough that a regulatory act prevent public harm attributable to
the approved development; it must do no more than proportionally counter
separate proceeding. See John D. Echeverria, Takings and Errors, 51 ALA. L. REv. 1047, 1083-
84 (2000).
167Nollan stated that the government's access corridor condition "utterly fail[ed] to further the
end advanced as the justification for the prohibition." Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 837 (1987). Likewise, Dolan asserted, "A land use regulation does not effect a taking if it
'substantially advances legitimate state interests' and does not 'deny an owner economically
viable use of his land."' Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (internal citation
omitted). There was no claim in Nollan or Dolan that the development condition at issue denied
the property owner all economically viable use of the claimant's land; indeed, the claimants
presented no evidence of any economic impact at all. See infra note 185.
6
1 Jamison E. Colburn, Splitting the Atom of Property: Rights Experimentalism as Obligation
to Future Generations, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1411, 1441 (2009). See also Daniel Pollak,
Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Tries to Prune Agins Without Stepping on Nollan and
Dolan, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 925, 929 (2006).
169Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. As explained supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text, the
Court concluded that the exaction at issue-a public easement along the beach-did not in any
way serve its regulatory purpose of reducing "obstacles to viewing the beach." As discussed
supra note 42, however, the Court selected merely one purpose-improving visual access-of
several that the permitting entity had explicitly identified, and refused to reasonably infer other
public purposes not explicitly identified.
'70Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n.4, 838 (demanding a relationship between the regulation at issue
and "the public need . .. that the Nollans' new house creates or to which it contributes"). As
Justice Scalia later described it, the "substantially advance" test requires a "cause-and-effect
relationship between the property use restricted by the regulation and the social evil that the
regulation seeks to remedy." Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the public harm caused by the applicant's development project. 7 1 Such an
understanding of the "substantially advance" test closely parallels the
means-ends and cause-and-effect relationships that, as described above,
were examined by the judiciary in the course of due process analyses in the
now-rejected Lochner era.17 2
One might imagine, therefore, that Lingle's refutation of Agins'
"substantially advance" test necessitated the Court's overruling Nollan and
Dolan, as well.1 73  However, Lingle largely left the core of the Court's
exactions takings jurisprudence intact. 17 The Lingle Court suggested that
the Nollan and Dolan tests are "worlds apart" from the Agins test.'77 The
Court's attempt to distinguish the two rested on the fact that the Agins test
assessed whether some legitimate state interest is substantially advanced by
a given regulation, while the Nollan and Dolan tests assess only whether the
proffered exaction substantially advances the same legitimate state interest
that is threatened by the proposed development project.'76
'Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
172Douglas Kmiec describes Nollan as calling for a "closeness of fit between means and
ends" and demanding that "the burden of the regulation is properly placed on this landowner."
See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak nor
Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1651 (1988). See also Michelman, supra note 158, 1607-08
("[T]he Court expressly endorsed a form of semi-strict or heightened judicial scrutiny of
regulatory means-ends relationships in the course of invalidating, as a taking, the Commission's
conditional regulatory imposition on the Nollans."). Thomas Merrill suggests that Dolan's rough
proportionality standard "appears to incorporate elements of both least restrictive means analysis
and cost-benefit analysis." See Merrill, supra note 36, at 868.
173 See Lauren Reznick, Note, The Death of Nollan and Dolan? Challenging the
Constitutionality of Monetary Exactions in the Wake of Lingle v. Chevron, 87 B.U. L. Rev., 725,
747 (2007).
174See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005).
17s1Id at 545-48.
11
6 See id at 547 ("In neither [Nollan nor Dolan] did the Court question whether the exaction
would substantially advance some legitimate state interest. Rather, the issue was whether the
exactions substantially advanced the same interests that land-use authorities asserted would allow
them to deny the permit altogether.") (internal citations omitted). In an amicus brief filed in
support of the State of Hawaii, the Solicitor General of the United States pressed this very
distinction. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27-28,
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (No. 04-163), 2004 WL 2787143 at *27-28
("Because the governmental bodies in Nollan and Dolan sought to use the landowners' planned
development activities to justify uncompensated exactions that would otherwise have violated the
Constitution, the Court required a heightened showing, not simply that the permit conditions
would advance some state interest, but that they would alleviate germane problems, i.e., problems
caused by the permitted development activities themselves."). The State of Hawaii advocated for
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3. The Due Process-Takings Distinction and Exactions for the
Future
If the Court is correct on this "some"/"same" distinction, then it seems
that considering whether an exaction actually will produce its anticipated
public benefits is not relevant in analyzing an exaction takings claim.
Rather, the only apparent relevant inquires would be (1) whether the
exaction served the same interest threatened by the development, and
(2) whether the public cost of those harms attributable to the proposed
development is roughly the same as the cost of the burden borne by the
applicant through the exaction.177
These inquiries may represent the bounds of Nollan and Dolan review
in those cases involving exactions that confer obvious and immediate
benefits. To draw on an example offered earlier, one such case might
involve development that blocks a vertical access way to a public beach,
where the exaction demands a similar, alternative right-of-way to that
beach.178  However, consideration of takings claims in the context of
exactions for the future demonstrates that Nollan and Dolan can demand far
more than "same-ness"-they require scrutinizing more broadly the means
and ends of a regulatory decision well beyond the traditional deference
afforded to such acts under post-Lochner era substantive due process
jurisprudence.17 9
a different distinction, contending that Nollan and Dolan "are not traditional regulatory takings
cases at all; rather, they stand at a unique intersection of physical-occupations law and the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. [Nollan and Dolan] rest on their own foundations as a means
to address the potential for abuse in government exactions in the permitting context and have little
significance outside that unusual domain." Brief for Petitioners at 35, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (No. 04-t63), 2004 WL 2811060 at *35. Even if the State felt that
Nollan and Dolan were in error given their reliance on the Agins "substantially advance" test,
asking the Lingle Court to reverse not one but three of its holdings of the past twenty-five years
(Agins, Nollan, and Dolan) might have run the risk of demanding so much that the State could fail
on its primary goal of avoiding takings liability for the rent control statute at issue.
177 As noted above, however, the variables appropriate for comparison under Dolan 's "rough
proportionality" analysis are not necessarily settled. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
78 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
1
7 9One commentator pondered whether the preservation of Nollan and Dolan in Lingle was a
"force[d] ... distinction." See Sarah B. Nelson, Case Comment, Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 30
HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 290 (2006). See also Colburn, supra note 168, at 1442 n.157
(describing the distinction as "shaky"). But see Echeverria, supra note 66, at 40 (concluding that
Lingle provides a "neat, narrow definition of the scope of the Dolan and Nollan tests"). Though
Justice Stevens signed on to the Lingle opinion, it would appear that, unless his perspective
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The exactions at issue in the hypothetical involving Branch Durant set
forth in Part II are instructive. With respect to the exacted dedication for
roadway expansion, whether the same-ness required by Nollan is satisfied is
difficult to dispute. That a new condominium complex would contribute to
increased traffic is patent, and, in theory, there can be little doubt that
supplementing a road with additional lanes can improve traffic
conditions.180 That evident connectivity leaves, under the "same-ness"
approach, only the assessment of how much the exaction would cost the
developer and a comparison of that cost to the public cost of the traffic
problems the developer will create.18' Dolan asks whether those costs are
roughly the same-whereby the exaction is appropriate-or whether,
instead, the government has asked for too much.
Yet the foregoing analysis suggests that Nollan and Dolan demonstrate
that there is an additional question of interest: whether the roadway
exaction ultimately will substantially advance some legitimate state interest
at all. This additional inquiry is borne out, if implicitly, in Nollan and
Dolan themselves,' 8 2 as well as in the numerous lower court applications of
Nollan and Dolan that have found takings liability for exactions tied to
anticipated assembly of neighboring lands for future roadway expansion on
facts not too dissimilar from those in the Branch Durant hypothetical
offered above.183  In this light, land use regulations taking the form of
changed in the intervening decade, he might not have found Lingle's ruminations on Nollan and
Dolan altogether sound. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 410 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("In its application of what is essentially the doctrine of substantive due process, the [Dolan
majority] confuses the past with the present.").
80The Dolan Court, however, expressed concern as to whether a bike path would reduce
traffic. In Dolan, the city had calculated that the increased size of the retail store would add 435
car trips to the area per day. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395-96. The Court apparently desired an
estimate of how many car trips use of the bicycle path would avoid. Id. (contending that the city
must demonstrate that the public pedestrian and bicycle path "will, or is likely to"-as opposed to
"could"-address the projected traffic congestion) (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437,
447 (Or. 1993) (Peterson, C.J., dissenting)).
As discussed supra note 36, the variables appropriate for comparison under Dolan's
"rough proportionality" analysis are not settled. For instance, one scholar has argued that the
costs to the developer-the "foregone opportunity costs of the exaction"-should be compared
not to the external public costs of the proposed development but rather to the "expected reduction"
in these public costs that is generated by the exaction. See Merrill, supra note 36, at 885. For
purposes of this section, the part of the Dolan analysis within which a probing substantive review
is cabined is not as important as the fact that such a review is part of the Dolan analysis at all.
182See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
1s3See, e.g., Burton v. Clark Cnty., 958 P.2d 343, 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (awarding
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exactions for the future are susceptible to being declared unconstitutional in
a manner akin to the judicial dissolution of economic and other social
regulations of Lochner's bygone era.184
The analysis is similar with respect to the dedication exacted from
Durant for shore protection purposes. That Durant's proposed development
will, for instance, destroy existing sand dunes that have shore protection
value is evident; therefore, the dedications almost certainly serve the same
shore protection interest as that threatened by the development project, and
thus survive Nollan's same-ness scrutiny. Only if the costs of these
dedications exceed the public costs of the harms Durant is imposing on the
public-Dolan's same-ness scrutiny-should takings liability presumably
attach. Yet Nollan and Dolan again go beyond assessing those same-ness
relationships. While curiously disregarding the overall economic burden
the exactions place on Durant-a relevant consideration in all other takings
contexts 18 5-they require a heightened, due process-like inquiry into the
takings compensation because the exacted right-of-way for a piece of an emergency connector
road could be a "road to nowhere" since the adjacent development, and thus the planned road,
might never be constructed); Goss v. City of Little Rock, 151 F.3d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 1998)
(finding city liable for a taking for conditioning a rezoning request on a dedication for roadway
expansion, for any significant additional traffic would only be generated-and the roadway
expanded-"at some unknown point in the future"); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates
Ltd. P'ship., 135 S.W.3d 620, 635 (Tex. 2004). But see McClure v. City of Springfield, 28 P.3d
1222, 1228 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) ("If each property owner could avoid an exaction because the city
had not yet obtained all dedications necessary to improve the street, no improvement would be
possible."); Art Piculell Grp. v. Clackamas Cnty., 922 P.2d 1227, 1236 (Or. Ct. App. 1996);
Sparks v. Douglas Cnty., 904 P.2d 738, 746 (Wash. 1995) (en banc).
184 Though likely in rarer circumstances, the "some"/"same" distinction could even be
unjustifiable in cases involving exactions that do confer obvious and immediate benefits. For
instance, consider a landowner's application to develop a large restaurant on his vacant tract. The
restaurant admittedly will increase traffic congestion in the area. If the local government
conditioned that permit on the landowner dedicating a small speck of land for the erection of a
sign reading, "There are now more cars in the area due to this restaurant. Be careful.," the same-
ness tests likely are not violated: the sign serves the same interest (traffic) as that threatened by
the development, and the cost to the developer in dedicating this speck of land is likely far less
than the cost to the public in the form of increased traffic resulting from the landowner's
restaurant. However, exaction takings review very well could also involve an inquiry into
whether the means-the sign-would substantially advance the government's end of reducing
traffic. For a discussion of the debate surrounding the variables appropriate for comparison under
Dolan's "rough proportionality" analysis, see supra note 36.
8 See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 n.6 ("Petitioner assuredly is able to derive some
economic use from her property."); id. at 402 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Dolan . .. has offered no
evidence that her burden of compliance has any impact at all on the value or profitability of her
BAYLOR LAWREVIEW
wisdom of the government's actions. In other words, they require a probing
judicial inquiry into whether the ocean-side exactions actually ever will do
any public good at all. 186
That the answer to this inquiry is commonly in the negative is not
altogether surprising in light of the aforementioned judicial wariness of
governmental forecasting in the exactions context and the fact that the
government, even though sitting as the defendant, bears a steep burden of
proof in exaction takings cases. Effectively demanding that exactions
demonstrate an immediate and assuredly successful response to a public
problem reveals that Lingle's distinguishing between an exaction's
substantial advancement of "some" legitimate state interest and an
exaction's substantial advancement of the "same" legitimate state interest
threatened by the proposed development is difficult to justify. The probing
substantive judicial review that Nollan and Dolan command puts into
constitutional jeopardy any exactions that intend to benefit the broader
community at the future moment in time when cumulative impacts of a
current development proposal converge with other anticipated development
or events.
IV. EXACTIONS FOR THE FUTURE: AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL
The preceding Parts of this article have highlighted the practical
concerns that landowners have with the government's exacting dedications
for the future-assembly and forecasting uncertainty' 8 7-and analyzed how
those practical concerns are reflected in exaction takings jurisprudence.' 88
It is quite possible that Nollan, Dolan, and their progeny should be
reconsidered in light of their above-described break with several key
principles underlying traditional takings law. The aforementioned themes
planned development."); McUsic, supra note 36, at 608 (contending that Nollan and Dolan
protect not market value but rather some apparently fundamental interest in controlling land); J.
Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 239, 247 (1990) (suggesting that in Nollan,
the majority "put economic losses to the owners to one side" and "said little about [it]").
Consideration of the economic burden on permittees had previously been considered relevant by
many state courts in assessing takings challenges to exactions. See, e.g., E. Neck Estates, Ltd. V.
Luchsinger, 305 N.Y.S.2d 922 (App. Div. 1969) (finding an exaction unreasonable because it
would have diminished by $90,000 property valued at just over $200,000).
186 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
1 See supra Part II.B-C.
188 See supra Part III.
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that are unique to exaction takings law-an aversion to planning 89 and a
reversion to a rather probing judicial review of a regulation's efficacy90-
can contribute to rather extreme results: a permitting official's fear of
encumbering his or her agency with an exaction taking could expose
landowners to more outright application denials; 91 conversely, these fears
could result in the equally socially detrimental result of the government's
conferring unconditional approvals-i.e., waiving its regulatory
responsibility-for projects with anticipated negative, if temporally distant,
community impacts.192  Ironically, the very exaction system that was
designed to bring about an outcome serving the interests of all parties often
can have precisely the opposite effect.' 9 3
However, while retreating from Nollan and Dolan for these reasons may
be prudent, this article assumes that the above-depicted themes unique to
current exaction takings law will continue to stand as considerable restraints
on exactions-and particularly exactions for the future-moving forward.
In light of this assumption, local governments seeking to insulate
themselves from takings liability must consider slightly more creative
approaches than the mere imposition of traditional dedication and easement
requirements to counter future cumulative impacts to which development is
expected to contribute.
One such alternative, conceptual approach is outlined in this Part. This
'89 See supra Part III.A.
190 See supra Part III.B.
191See Byrne & Grannis, supra note 3, at 15 ("Governments dread regulatory takings
litigation, which can be uncertain, lengthy, expensive, and, fairly or not, stigmatizing."); Fenster,
Takings Formalism, supra note 17, at 665 (suggesting that, in risk-averse jurisdictions with the
political will to deny development permits outright, "the property owner is significantly worse off
than if she could bargain freely with the local government over conditions that might win an
approval").
192 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Davidson et al., "Where's Dolan?": Exactions Law in 1998, 30
URB. LAW. 683, 697 (1998) (suggesting Nollan and Dolan create a "chilling effect" on local
governments' use of exactions). These waivers predictably would confer an unfair windfall on
particular property owners at the public's expense. Third-party suits to challenge such waivers
have faced mixed results. Compare Dudek v. Umatilla Cnty., 69 P.3d 751, 758 (Or. Ct. App.
2003) (rejecting a neighbor's challenge where the county waived road widening and improvement
requirements for fear that imposing the requirements might violate Dolan's proportionality
threshold), with McAllister v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365, 384 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009) (concluding that the record did not support the Coastal Commission's defense of its
issuance of a permit allowing erection of a house in an environmentally sensitive area on the
ground that failure to issue the permit would have been a compensable taking).
19 See Mulvaney, supra note 2, at 308-09.
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approach involves temporally segmenting the government's sought after
interest. Instead of conditioning development permits on a present
dedication or easement, a local government might condition development
approval on a future interest that will become possessory only upon the
happening of stated events. 194  Below, Section A first illustrates this
unconventional approach to exaction imposition. It explains how temporal
segmentation in the exactions context responds to the assembly, forecasting,
and other landowner concerns outlined above, while reducing the prospects
of takings disputes without necessarily sacrificing public objectives.
Thereafter, Section B explores two potential downsides of this approach,
which surround spoliation and enforceability. Section C provides a brief
summary. The proposal outlined herein is to be viewed merely as a
potential "compromise" position: it respects the existing if peculiar
constitutional constraints on exactions, while avoiding both (1) unfairly
burdening permit applicants with excessive exactions or denials, and
(2) unfairly bestowing windfalls on landowners in the form of
unconditioned permits.
A. Temporal Segmentation in the Context ofExactions
The following alternative approach to exaction imposition could open
the door for reasonable implementation of exactions aimed at anticipated,
future harms while reducing some takings liability concerns. While an
articulation of the full practical details of this approach is fodder for future
scholarship, this section describes the theory's basic workings and
advantages.
Facing a land use application, the state might require the developer to
confer an interest in the relevant segment of land that gives the state
possession of that land only if and when specified triggering events occur.
194 The proposal herein relies on several thoughtful articles by James Titus regarding the
possibility of outwardly condemning "rolling" easements to counter sea-level rise along bay front
shores, as well as the work of Joseph Sax, Peter Byrne, and others who have built on Titus's
scholarship. See James G. Titus, Rolling Easements, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, (June 2011), http://www.epa.gov/cre/downloads/rollingeasementsprimer.pdf
[hereinafter Titus, Rolling Easements]; Titus, supra note 59, at 718; James G. Titus, Rising Seas,
Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting
Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1285 (1998) [hereinafter Titus, Rising Seas]; Joseph L.
Sax, The Fate of Wetlands in the Face of Rising Sea Levels: A Strategic Proposal, 9 UCLA J.
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 143, 148 (1991); Byrne & Grannis, supra note 3, at 36.
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To facilitate the imposition of this exaction, then, the landowner's estate
must be temporally partitioned.19 5
Though not described in these terms, some jurisdictions already have
implemented temporal partition models in the context of conditioning
permits. In Hawaii, for example, an impact fee statute requires local and
state governments to refund impact fees to the developer or the developer's
successor if they are not expended within six years.19 6 In other words, the
payee-the state-holds the present interest in the paid fee, while the
payor-the landowner-retains a future interest that becomes possessory
when the state does not use that fee within the noted time period.19 7 The
'9 Such an arrangement could take several forms under property's complicated system of
estates. In some instances, the state's future interest would become possessory automatically upon
the happening of the triggering event, requiring action on the state's part only if it did not intend to
keep possession of its interest. See generally Lewis M. Simes, Fifty Years of Future Interests, 50
HARV. L. REV. 749 (1937). In others, the state's future interest would require an affirmative act
on the part of the state in order for the state's interest to become possessory. See Roger W.
Andersen, Present and Future Interests: A Graphic Explanation, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 101,
114-15 (1995) (describing two general groups of future interests, including those "aggressive"
future interests that divest other interests and those "patient" future interests waiting for natural
expiration of a present interest). In jurisdictions where the common law rule against perpetuities
remains applicable, the property owner might convey the relevant strip of land to the state in fee,
with the understanding that the state would then convey a present possessory interest back to the
landowner. See Jessie Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648,
1705 (1985) (explaining that reversionary interests in the grantor generally are exempt from the
rule against perpetuities). Should the landowner convey the strip of land to the state on the
promise that the state return a present interest to the landowner conditioned on a right to re-enter,
such an arrangement is somewhat analogous to the state retaining an option in a dedication or
easement if and when a particular event occurs. In this sense, contracts, as opposed to property,
precepts could dictate the parties' relative interests.
196 See Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-144(5) (LexisNexis 2007). Local governments have
instilled similar expiration periods. See, e.g., Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs, 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (discussing a county ordinance that required
impact fees placed into a trust fund to be spent within six years or returned to the current owner of
the property); FORT WORTH, TEX., REV. ORDINANCES ch. 30, art. VIII, § 30-193 (2012)
(effective May 13, 2008) ("Upon application, any transportation impact fee or portion thereof...
which has not been expended within the service area within ten (10) years from the date of
payment, shall be refunded to the record owner of the property for which the impact fee was
paid. . . ."). In certain instances, California law requires local governments to identify the
approximate date by which the construction of the relevant public improvement will commence.
See CAL. GOVT. CODE § 66006(b)(1)(F) (West 2009).
197 Hawaii's model bears some analogy to recent case law in other jurisdictions suggesting
that the government must put outwardly condemned property to public use within a specified
period. See, e.g., S. Portland Assocs. v. City of South Portland, 746 A.2d 365 (Me. 2000).
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goal of these expiration periods apparently is to assure that the
government's ability to take property-either outright or as part of an
exchange for a development permit that otherwise could have been
denied-is not used simply as a revenue-raising device for not-yet-
determined purposes.198 In other words, the Hawaii legislature seemingly
believes that exacting temporally constrained present interests presumably
serves to more closely tailor permit conditions to meet actual project
impacts.
Theoretically, exacting future interests can produce the same result.
Unlike the Hawaii example, though, the applicant in the model offered here
retains the present interest-in a defeasible fee-while the state holds the
contingent future interest.199 For instance, to return to the hypothetical
offered above in Part II involving Branch Durant, the city might require the
conferral of a future interest in the roadway dedication that is triggered if
and when (1) the assembly of all necessary lots is complete and (2) the
roadway expansion becomes a public necessity and a fiscal reality.2 00
Likewise, the city might demand a future interest in the shore protection
dedication20' that is triggered if and when sea-level rises to a particular
202
elevation above a pre-determined, community-wide reference point.
'"See, e.g., David L. Callies & Glenn H. Sonoda, Providing Infrastructure for Smart
Growth: Land Development Conditions, 43 IDAHO L. REv. 351, 358 (2007).
199This approach bears analogy to waivers of remonstrance to the formation of local
improvement districts. In effect, a landowner might receive development approval on the
condition that he waive his ability to object to any future creation of a local improvement district,
such that when that local improvement district is created, the permittee would be required to pay
into it without challenge. See Sullivan, supra note 106, at 33 (explaining Oregon's policy of
allowing the imposition of assessments under local improvement districts). It is distinct, however,
from "recapture agreements," where a developer is required to advance the full costs of a public
improvement up front, on the condition that those costs will subsequently be apportioned among
the various properties that benefit from them and the original payor refunded the appropriate
amount with interest. See Smith, supra note 18, at 9.
2oTailoring of the triggering conditions would need to be done with care in order to
minimize the possibility of the parties later having a difference of opinion as to whether a
particular triggering event actually occurred.
201 Some scholars suggest that the public trust doctrine already affords a non-contingent future
interest in all dry land that will be inundated by sea-level rise. See Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret
R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property Rights: The Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing
Climate, 30 STAN. ENvTL. L. J. 51 (2011). See also Andrew C. Silton & Jessica Grannis,
Stemming the Tide: How Local Governments Can Manage Rising Flood Risks, GEORGETOWN
CLIMATE CENTER, 19-20, 23 (April 2010), www.law.unc.edu/documents/clear/vacasestudy.pdf;
Titus, supra note 59, at 738. This position-which, if adopted, could alleviate the need to exact a
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There are detriments to such an approach, several of which are outlined
in Section B below. However, exacting future interests does at least
partially respond to landowners' practical concerns regarding assembly and
forecasting uncertainty that dedications exacted for the future initially
generate. In addition, exacting future interests might soften any economic
blow that conceivably could trigger the filing of an exaction takings claim
in the first place. Each of these points-assembly, uncertainty, and costs-
is addressed briefly in turn below.2 03
1. Land Assembly
From the developer's perspective, any uncertainty regarding land
assembly would be eliminated. The developer's current use of the strip of
land presumably would not be impaired by anything other than the common
law doctrine of waste.204  Any current use of that strip would only come
with the risk that he may need to abandon that use upon the triggering
events.20 5  Only if and when the triggering events occur would the
developer be charged with removing any structures or otherwise preparing
the land for the state's possession. 2 06
future interest in the context of sea-level rise-could require (in at least some, if not all,
jurisdictions) a dramatic alteration of the common law public trust doctrine and the doctrine of
waste.
202The community-wide nature of the reference point would make individual efforts to hold
back the sea in front of one's property-e.g., through the erection of a lot-wide sea wall or other
obstruction-largely irrelevant. The government arguably can wait to implement some shore
protection measures until the sea rises to a particular elevation, though other measures will be
more productive if implemented immediately. The exacted future interests discussed in this Part
necessarily, then, refer only to the former. Presumably, these exacted future interests could be
employed in pursuit of a more ecological approach to sea-level rise than that suggested in the
Branch Durant hypothetical by simply allowing natural landward migration of the high water line.
See Titus, Rolling Easements, supra note 194.
203 In addition to the advantages outlined in the sub-sections that follow, an additional benefit
of this alternative approach to exaction imposition is its ease of implementation, for local
governments presumably can experiment with temporal segmentation in the exaction context
without the conferral of any additional authority from the state or federal level. See, e.g., Poirier,
supra note 56, at 106 ("Cities ... sometimes indeed do serve as laboratories of policy
experimentation.").
204For a discussion of the doctrine of waste, see infra Part IV.B.l.
205 Again, in the Branch Durant hypothetical, these triggering events would include the state's
proceeding with needed roadway expansion following the assembly of all necessary lots or the
rise in sea-level to a pre-determined elevation. See supra notes 200-202 and accompanying text.




Landowners challenging exactions for the future are undoubtedly
concerned that present dedications impose an inordinate personal burden-
by preventing far too much development-for public benefits that are tied
to projections that are inherently uncertain.207 Exacting future interests,
however, minimizes such risk.208 The importance of whether the landowner
and the government agree on the baseline-e.g., on the accuracy of the
state's forecast about development or natural hazards in a given region-is
diminished when the state exacts only a contingent future interest. 20 9 If the
forecasted development or natural hazards never do in fact come close to
triggering the state's future interest, such exactions only minimally burden
landowners.
Still, to further minimize the effects of forecasting uncertainty, it is
conceivable that landowners might advocate for the creation of an
additional layer of temporality: a time period within which the state's
future interest must become possessory or fail.210  If indeed a temporal
protection against landowners who are economically unable or unwilling to prepare the land for
the state's possession upon the happening of the triggering events.
207See supra Part III.A.4. As one commentator critical of local governments exacting present
dedications for the future explained, "the development of land has become a system for
accumulating a municipal kitty." See Smith, supra note 18, at 28.
208This risk minimization can be analogized to amortization schemes that phase out non-
conforming uses. See, e.g., Oswalt v. Cnty. of Ramsey, 371 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (declaring that a municipality can phase out non-conforming uses over a "reasonable"
period of years without paying compensation); Titus, Rising Seas, supra note 194, at 1350
("Although a policy that required land to be abandoned fifty years hence would often allow no
productive use when the deadline finally arrived, it would have a trivial impact on the current
value of the parcel.").
209A municipality's confidence that anticipated future development or other events will occur
is necessarily a complicated, subjective inquiry based on a variety of economic, scientific, and
other factors. And, of course, whether anticipated future development or other events actually
occur is provable only in hindsight. To allay property owners' fears of unbridled projections
(and-potentially, at least-simultaneously to improve government's effectiveness), it may be
worthwhile to consider a formalized follow-up review process to assess the accuracy of
(1) predictions made in the course of individual permitting decisions regarding projected
development and other anticipated events, and (2) the projected benefits of the mitigation
measures reflected in imposed exactions.
210The California Coastal Commission has experimented with imposing such a time period.
See, e.g., Daniel v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375. 385 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing an
exacted offer to dedicate a public access way, which would expire if the state did not accept that
offer within a period of twenty-five years). In certain jurisdictions, the rule against perpetuities
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limitation is placed on the government's future interest, it may be possible
to institute a presumption whereby, upon that pre-designated date, the
state's future interest terminates if the state fails to rebut that presumption.
For instance, the state arguably could rebut this presumption on the pre-
designated date if it proves that it has collected a significant number-
though not all-of the lots necessary to expand a given roadway,
development in the area is increasing (if at a slower rate than originally
forecast), and the roadway expansion is part of an approved capital
improvements plan. Under this model, a successful rebuttal would result in
an extension of the time period within which the state's future interest can
become possessory.21
3. Costs
Consideration of the percentage reduction in the relevant property's
market value due to an exaction is, as noted above, mysteriously absent
under the Nollan and Dolan exaction takings model, despite its prominence
in nearly all other areas of takings law.2 12 However, the existence and
extent of the economic impact on a landowner resulting from an exaction
likely plays into the landowner's calculus of whether to challenge an
exaction in the first place.2 13 With the state exacting only a future interest,
the landowner would be allowed to use the strip of land up until the point in
time when the triggering events occur and the state takes possession.214
might mandate an expiration period.
211 Alternatively, if a "hard" time limitation is placed on the state's future interest, there may
be certain instances when, at the point it must "return" the future interest, the state should have the
ability to impose an alternate condition. If, for instance, the developer's project does in fact
contribute to traffic problems, but, within the temporal confines of its future interest, the state is
unable to acquire the necessary parcels to widen the street, it could be appropriate for the state at
that point to impose an alternative condition to alleviate the traffic, e.g., requiring the landowner
to fund a stoplight, yield sign, crossing guard, etc.
212See infra notes 167, 185 and accompanying text.
213 This would appear to be particularly true if compensation were considered the exclusive
remedy in takings litigation. In Lingle, the U.S. Supreme Court seemingly resolved that injunctive
relief generally is inappropriate in takings cases. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528,
544 (2005). However, whether a successful exaction takings claim offers a remedy other than
compensation remains unclear.
214See Titus, Rising Seas, supra note 194, at 1285 (making a similar claim with respect to
"rolling" easements). If the state fails to assert its interest upon the happening of the triggering
events, it is conceivable that in select jurisdictions the landowner ultimately may be able to gain
title to what is now the state's strip of land through adverse possession. At English common law,
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Landowners likely would self-amortize this strip of land based on their
own projections as to when the triggering events will occur.215  The
government's exacting a future interest may encourage the landowner to
strategically depreciate the strip, say, by limiting the use of it to a parking
lot, landscaping, mobile food carts, et216 Still, the developer would have
the ability to reap some economic return from this strip of land, which he
would not have been able to do had the state required an immediate
dedication. Moreover, a risk-taking landowner may make major capital
expenditures in the hopes that the triggering event never occurs or that the
government's interest otherwise never will be enforced. 217 In this way, the
state's exacting a future interest will impose a lesser economic burden on a
landowner than the state's exacting a present interest in fee. 2 18 That is, the
the maxim nullus tempus occurrit regi (time does not run against the king) barred adverse
possession against the government. American courts often have relied on this principle, as well as
state constitutional provisions that restrict the alienation of land held in the public trust, to prohibit
the adverse possession of public property. However, select states permit adverse possession
against state property interests on the same terms that they permit adverse possession against
private interests. See, e.g., Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession Against the States: The
Hornbooks Have It Wrong, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939 (1996).
215See Sax, supra note 194, at 151. Some developers, however, may dislike the lingering
uncertainty underlying their own projections on when the triggering events might occur. For
some, finality may be more desirable than waiting for later events or a future termination date,
even where the former could prove significantly more expensive than the latter in hindsight.
216The landowner may do so for several reasons, including the fact that selling-or even
renting-the strip with such a limitation attached could (1) be difficult, and (2) lead to
complicated valuation problems should that new owner make significant improvements to the land
prior to the triggering event or grow psychologically attached to the land. See Titus, Rising Seas,
supra note 194, at 1326.
217 Regarding enforcement of the government's interest upon the happening of the stated
events, see infra Part IV.B.2. There also exists the possibility of mischief, whereby landowners
could covertly negotiate with other landowners in some instances to strategically, if artificially,
delay or avoid the occurrence of the stated triggering events.
218James Titus has suggested that the government could purchase "rolling" easements along
coastlines-i.e., easements that move with the rise and fall of the sea-now at a fraction of the
cost that the state would incur if it waited until the sea actually rose to a specific level. Titus,
Rising Seas, supra note 194, at 1313. Exacted future interests are similar to Titus's approach in
this way: developer's use of a high discount rate makes the approach more, not less, feasible. See
id. at 1331 n. 180. In many other contexts-particularly in the context of environmental policy-
where regulation is intended to produce public benefits over multiple decades, regulated parties
advocate for a high discount rate that will produce economic figures that will discourage
regulation. It is possible that regulated landowners could, in an effort to increase the amount of
takings compensation at stake, reverse course when faced with an exacted future interest by
asserting that, say, the road widening project or sea-level rise is more likely to happen sooner than
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present value of the exacted future interest would be discounted by the rate
of return the landowner could reap for the strip of land, compounded over
the number of years likely to pass before the state's interest is triggered.219
B. Disadvantages of Temporal Segmentation in the Exactions Realm
The prior section suggests that exacting future interests is at least
partially responsive to the concerns landowners raise in situations where the
state exacts present dedications for the future. However, exacting future
interests may come with several possible disadvantages from the
perspective of those members of the public who allegedly are protected
from the impacts of development via exactions. These disadvantages
include issues surrounding spoliation of the property and political
incentives against "enforcement" of the state's future interest upon the
happening of the stated events. These disadvantages are addressed in turn
below.
1. Spoliation
Holding only a future interest, the state does not have the ability to
actively manage and maintain the strip of land in a coordinated manner with
any other collected strips. 2 20 There is a risk, then, that the present interest
the government predicts, though such a claim could deter potential buyers. Id. at 133 1 n. 181. In
general, settling on the appropriate discount rate to apply in evaluating decisions surrounding land
uses admittedly is often quite difficult and contentious.
219A similar phenomenon is evident when comparing two famous takings cases involving
subsurface mining. The foundational, if cryptic, regulatory takings case of Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon involved Pennsylvania's Kohler Act that prohibited mining activities when such
activities threatened homes with subsidence. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-413
(1922). The U.S. Supreme Court declared that the Kohler Act immediately destroyed the
subsurface estate held by the plaintiff, the Pennsylvania Coal Company, which sat below
residences currently at risk of subsiding. See id. at 412-16. Yet sixty years later, the Court found
that Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine and Land Conservation Act-which also sought to
minimize the risk of subsidence by limiting the amount of coal that could be mined-did not
amount to a regulatory taking because mining could continue until subsidence became a threat.
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498-501 (1987). That some
ability to mine remained proved material, though that ability grew only out of the legislature's
preemptive approach to a public safety problem that would inevitably arise in the future.
220 See, e.g., Byrne & Grannis, supra note 3, at 21. Dissenting in Dolan, Justice Stevens
pondered whether the state's requiring a dedication rather than a lesser interest-an easement-
would be better for the landowner for several reasons. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 404
(1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In short, upon a dedication to the state of the strip of land on
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holder could spoil the property. The doctrine of waste affords future
interest holders only limited protection against activities by the present
interest holder that harm the future interest.221 The sooner and more likely
the future interest is to vest in possession, the greater protections the
doctrine provides.2 22 Yet determining the likelihood and timing of the
government's interest becoming possessory reignites the same type of
forecasting uncertainties that precipitated takings jurisprudence's disfavor
of exactions for the future to begin with.223 And even if the government
could prove that the landowner was liable for waste-say, a permittee so
mined the subsurface of the relevant strip of land to the point where the
surface could no longer be used for a road when the state's interest came
due-the government would have expended considerable time in litigation,
and it is not clear what its remedy might be.224
It may be possible to compose reasonable use limitations aimed at
assuring the relevant segment of land will remain suitable for future
conversion to the state's designated use. 2 25  However, these limitations
could increase the upfront economic burden on the landowner, thereby
which she was prohibited from building in the first place, Dolan would not bear the costs
associated with maintenance, property taxes, or tort liability. Id While the landowner would
continue to bear the costs associated with maintenance, property taxes, or tort liability under the
proposal herein, those costs likely would be more than offset by the ability to put the strip of land
to an economic use for the period preceding the triggering events.
221 Where, as here, the possessory estate is a defeasible fee, the future interest holder
ordinarily cannot obtain relief at law under the doctrine of waste for conduct that, if engaged in by
the holder of a possessory estate that will end naturally (e.g., a life estate or a term of years),
would trigger liability. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 160 (3d. ed. 2000). However, relief in equity may be available to the holder of an
executory interest, possibility of reverter, or right of re-entry "as against the owner of a present
defeasible fee simple estate, provided the latter has committed 'wanton,' 'unconscionable,' or
'malicious' acts which [sic] reduce the value of the fee simple, and provided that there is a
reasonable probability that the plaintiffs future interest will become possessory." Id. at 163. See
also Olin L. Browder, Jr., Defeasible Fee Estates in Oklahoma-An Addendum, 6 OKLA. L. REV.
482, 484 (1953).
222 See Stoebuck, supra note 221, at 160.
223 See supra Part II.C., III.A.4.
224Absent technology to re-stabilize the surface, there seemingly is no remedy that could
allow for the government to expand the road in the location in which it had planned to do so.
In the Branch Durant hypothetical offered above in Part II, the focus of these limitations
would be to prohibit interference with either road widening or shore protection measures even
after all structures on the property have been razed.
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debasing a key distinction between exacted future interests and exacted
dedications in fee. 22 6
2. "Enforcing" the Future Interest
Arguably more disconcerting than the spoliation issue described above,
there is a possibility that the state will not enforce its future interest once
the triggering events occur. This possibility is not insignificant, in light of
the difficult political decision of requiring the removal of parking lots,
landscaping, structures, or even workers and residents from the relevant
227strip of land at the point in time when the state's interest comes due.
When one private party holds the present interest in a given estate and
another the future interest,2 28 the future interest holder likely will evict the
present interest holder should that present interest holder remain on the
property after his estate's natural end. Yet from the landowner's
perspective in the context of exacted future interests, his or her benefit of
the "bargain"-the conditional permit-could, by the time of the triggering
events, have faded into the past.229 Therefore, the government's enforcing
its future interest could be viewed-though erroneously-as imposing a
"new" uncompensated loss. 2 30  Distinct from a private party holding a
226See supra notes 212-219 and accompanying text.
227 See, e.g., Titus, Rising Seas, supra note 194, at 1331 (explaining, in the context of
tidelands protection policy, the risk of "backsliding," where those with "narrow interests who
gambled and lost are able to able to persuade policy makers" to repeal the policy and "bail them
out"); Sax, supra note 194, at 148 (explaining the prospect of landowners "gambl[ing] on the
rules of the game changing"). In the context of outright condemnation of a waterfront easement to
allow for natural migration of wetlands, Sax advocates for the government's conferral of an
"insurance policy with a present value equal to the present value of the easement" to "decrease[]
public sympathy" for the landowner. Id. at 157, 159. Under Sax's model, the landowner would
receive the proceeds of the purchase price-invested and compounded over time-only upon the
sea's rising to a particular elevation. Id. at 154. This thought-provoking approach is not
applicable in the context of exactions where the "payment" is the front-end conferral of the
conditional permit.
228For example, private landowner A might hold a reversion that follows private tenant B's
one-year leasehold.
229 Landowners might be said to suffer from "availability bias" at the time they receive the
permit, for losses will only occur-if they occur at all-years hence. See, e.g., Dana, supra note
63, at 1325.
230 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992) (concluding that
the government may "exercise" its regulatory authority to mirror pre-existing, common law
limitations on title without implicating the Takings Clause); Daniel v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara,
288 F.3d 375, 385 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a landowner's claim that the state's exercise of an
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similar interest, the government presumably cares about the immediate
economic plight of its constituents-politically or altruistically-such that
it may be willing to subordinate its position as the future interest holder.23'
C. Summarizing the Concept of Temporal Segmentation in the
Context of Exactions
The above proposal offers the conceptual idea of incorporating
temporally severed property interests into the realm of land use exactions.
In some instances, it may offer local governments an alternative to the
option for a public access easement exacted from the landowner's predecessor in interest
constituted a compensable taking); United States v. 30.54 Acres of Land, 90 F.3d 790, 792 (3d
Cir. 1996) ("Because the navigational servitude was a preexisting limitation on the landowners'
title to riparian land, we hold the Corps' exercise of the servitude . .. was not a taking .... ). In
the context of an exacted future interest, a landowner might get comfortable with the status quo-
its present possessory use of the relevant strip of land-such that it may be difficult to frame the
state's enforcement of its interest on that strip of land as anything other than a loss. Indeed, a
landowner, whether deliberately or out of inertia, could engage in absolutely no self-amortization
of the strip of land, such that, in light of the significance of the landowner's (now partially self-
created) "loss" upon the triggering event, the government might be more encouraged to waive its
interest. Sax, supra note 194, at 151-52 ("The paradox here is that, from the point of view of the
landowners . . . the worse things get the better they are."). This complication bears relation to the
general claim that the Takings Clause's requiring the government to pay market value incentivizes
property owners to "overinvest in buildings that they know have a significant chance of being
destroyed by subsequent government projects." See Poirier, supra note 37, at 263 n.56. The
incentive here, however, is not the payment of compensation but rather the possibility that the
state will not enforce the interest that it already "paid for" through issuance of a conditional
permit. In this sense, further consideration of exacting future interests may benefit from analogy
to the principle of regret-the extent to which the law allows contracting parties to change their
minds. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED
DECISIONS (2000).
231 See Sax, supra note 194, at 150, 155; Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 201, at 70. Had the
state originally exacted a present dedication, it is far less likely that the state would "return" that
possessory interest upon the happening of the triggering events than it would be to subordinate its
claim upon the happening of those same events where it originally had exacted only a future
interest. Behavioral economists might call this a form of "divestiture aversion," for the state as
holder of an existing possessory interest is less likely to part with that possessory interest than it
would be to "pay"-politically-to enforce its future interest under otherwise identical
circumstances. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J.
LEGAL STUD. 199, 203 (2006). The state's willingness to subordinate its future interest may be
particularly strong in instances where the future, intended public use of the property is for open
space or a natural area. In implementing a model of this sort, then, it may be important to
distinguish between land that will be used for roads or other improvements, and land that, from
the triggering event forward, will not be disturbed.
EXACTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
common, constitutionally perilous practice of exacting present interests in a
way that serves both public and private objectives. This approach might be
useful, as noted herein, in the context of responding to development impacts
that are not anticipated to occur until some point further off into the future.
However, it is conceivable that such temporal segmentation also could be
useful in some instances where even traditional exactions responding to
near-term harms have been declared unconstitutional.232
V. CONCLUSION
New development commonly contributes to projected infrastructural
demands caused by multiple parties or amplifies the impacts of anticipated
natural hazards. At times, these impacts only can be addressed through
coordinated actions over a lengthy period. In theory, the ability of local
governments to attach conditions, or "exactions," to discretionary land use
permits can serve as one tool to accomplish this end. However, exaction
takings law's narrow focus on demonstrably measurable, immediate
development impacts can impede communities' efforts to prepare for such
future contingencies. Unlike traditional exactions that respond to
immediate development harms, "exactions for the future"-those exactions
responsive to cumulative anticipated future harms-admittedly can present
land assembly concerns and involve inherently uncertain long-range
government forecasting. Yet it is not clear these practical impediments are
sufficient to warrant the near categorical prohibition on such exactions that
is imposed by current Takings Clause jurisprudence.
This article first highlights landowners' practical concerns surrounding
land assembly and forecasting uncertainty that can pose difficulties for local
governments considering the implementation of exactions for the future.
From there, it explores two rather peculiar features of the U.S. Supreme
Court's exaction takings jurisprudence that presumably flow from these
practical concerns-namely, an aversion to planning and a reversion to a
probing form of substantive judicial review-that expose a near categorical
rule against exactions that seek to address future harms. That these features
denote a significant break from other major areas of takings jurisprudence
232 1n Nollan, for instance, tasking the applicant with conferring to the public a right to
traverse across or otherwise use a segment of the applicant's beach property within a short,
specified time period on either side of high tide would have a significantly lesser impact on the
applicant that an outright dedication. Of course, this modification does not necessarily solve the
nexus question. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
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might suggest that exaction takings law is due for a marked adjustment.
However, assuming the judicial predilection against exactions for the future
will remain in place prospectively, this article suggests that local
governments might consider an alternative approach to conditioning
development permits.
The alternative approach set forth in this article involves temporally
partitioning property interests at the outset to allow for the exaction of
future interests, as opposed to the commonly exacted present dedications or
easements. Segmenting, across time, the government's sought-after interest
could open the door for reasonable implementation of exactions aimed at
anticipated harms presented by phenomena such as population rise and
climate change, which threaten to place new stresses on public
infrastructure and the environment. This approach at least partially
responds to the practical concerns and jurisprudential complications that
exactions for the future initially spark. Admittedly, however, it also comes
with the potential detriments of landowner spoliation of the state's future
interest and inadequate enforcement due to proximate political or other
considerations. While any particular details of the alternative approach to
exaction imposition offered herein are only suggestive, the above
observations on the advantages and disadvantages of temporally
segmenting property interests in the exactions context hopefully present
fodder for prospective elaboration and discussion.
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